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Abstract
The objective  of this paper  is to assess both the aggregate  growth rate, high residual  subsistence sector,  non-
growth effects  and the distributional  consequences of  increasing wages, but lower inequality.  The financial
financial  liberalization  as observed  in Thailand from  liberalization brings  welfare gains and losses to different
1976 to  1996. A general equilibrium  occupational  choice  subsets of the population.  Primary winners  are talented
model with two sectors,  one  without intermediation,  and  would-be entrepreneurs  who lack credit and cannot
the other  with borrowing and  lending, is taken to Thai  otherwise  go into business  (or invest  little capital). Mean
data.  Key parameters  of the production  technology  and  gains  for these winners range from 17 to 34 percent of
the distribution  of entrepreneurial  talent are estimated  by  observed  overall average  household income.  But
maximizing  the likelihood of transition  into business  liberalization  also induces greater demand by
given  initial  wealth  as observed  in two distinct  datasets.  entrepreneurs  for workers  resulting in increases  in the
Other parameters  of the model  are calibrated  to try to  wage and lower profits of relatively rich entrepreneurs  of
match the two decades  of growth  as well as observed  the same order of magnitude as the observed  overall
changes  in inequality,  labor share, savings,  and the  average  income of firm owners. Foreign capital  has no
number of entrepreneurs.  Without an  expansion  in the  significant  impact on growth  or the distribution of
size of the intermediated  sector,  Thailand  would have  observed  income.
evolved very differently,  namely,  with a drastically  lower
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1  Introduction
The objective of the paper is to assess the aggregate,  growth  effects  and the distributional  consequences
of  financial  liberalization  and  globalization.  There  has been  some  debate  in  the  literature  about  the
benefits and potential costs of financial sector  reforms.  The micro credit movement has pushed for tiered
*We would  like to thank  Guillermo  Moloche  and Ankur  Vora for excellent  research  assistance  and the  referees  for their
both detailed and expository comments.  Gine gratefully  acknowledges  financial support  from the Bank of Spain.  Townsend
would  like to thank  NSF and  NIH  for their financial  support  We are  especially  indebted to Sombat  Sakuntasathien  for
collaboration  and for making possible the data collection in Thailand.  Comments from Abhijit Banerjee, Ricardo  Caballero,
Bengt  Holmstr6m  and participants at the MIT macro  lunch group are  gratefully acknowledged.lending,  or  linkages  from  formal  financial  intermediaries  to small joint  liability or  community  groups.
But a major concern with general structural reforms is the idea that benefits  will not trickle down, that
the poor will be  neglected,  and that inequality  will increase.  Similarly,  globalization  and capital inflows
are  often claimed  to be  associated with growth  although  the effect  of growth  on poverty  is still a much
debated  topic'
Needless  to  say,  we do not  study here all  possible  forms of liberalization.  Rather,  we focus  on  re-
forms  that  increase  outreach  on the  extensive  domestic  margin,  for  example,  less  restricted  licensing
requirements for financial institutions  (both foreign and domestic),  the reduction of excess capitalization
requirements,  and enhanced ability  to open new branches.  We capture  these reforms,  albeit  crudely  in
the model,  thinking of them as domestic  reforms that allow  deposit mobilization  and access to credit at
market clearing interest rates  for a segment  of the population that otherwise  would  have neither  formal
sector savings  nor credit.
We  take this methodology to  Thailand from  1976 to 19962.  Thailand  is a good country to study  for
a  number of reasons.  First,  Thailand  is often  portrayed  as  an example  of an emerging  market,  with
high income growth and increasing  inequality.  The GDP  growth from 1981-1995  was 8 percent per year,
and the  Gini  measure  of inequality  increased  from  .42  in  1976  to  .50 in  1996.  Second,  Jeong  (1999)
documents  in  his study of the  sources of growth  in Thailand,1976-1996,  that  access to  intermediation
narrowly defined accounts for 20 percent of the growth in per capita income while occupation shifts alone
account  for  21 percent.  While  the fraction  of non-farm  entrepreneurs  does not grow  much,  the  income
differential  of non-farm  entrepreneurs  to wage  earners  is  large  and thus  small  shifts  in the population
create  relatively large income  changes.  In fact,  the occupational  shift may have been financed by credit.
Also related, Jeong finds that 32 percent of changes in inequality between  1976-1996 are due to changes in
income differentials across occupations.  There is evidence that Thailand had a relatively restrictive credit
system but  also liberalized  during this period.  Officially,  interest  rates  ceilings  and lending  restrictions
were progressively  removed starting in 19893.  The data do seem to suggest a rather substantial  increase
in the number of households with access to formal intermediaries although this expansion  (which we call a
liberalization)  begins two  years earlier,  in  1987.  Finally, Thailand  experienced  a relatively large increase
in capital inflows from the late 1980's  to the  mid 1990's.
Our starting point is a relatively simple but general equilibrium model with credit constraints.  Specif-
ically,  we pick from the literature and extend the Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhard  (2000)  model  (LEB for short)
that features wealth-constrained entry into business and wealth-constrained investment  for entrepreneurs.
For our purposes, this  model has  several advantages.  It allows for  ex ante variation  in ability.  It allows
1See for example Gallup, Radelet and Warner  (1998)  and Dollar and  Kraay (2002) for evidence that growth helps reduce
poverty and the concerns of Ravallion  (2001, 2002)  about  their approach.
2We  focus  on  this  20 year  transition  period,  not  on the  financial  crisis  of  1997.  Our  own view  is  that  we  need  to
understand the growth that preceded  the crisis before  we can  analyze the crisis  itself.
30kuda and  Mieno (1999)  recount  from one perspective the history of financial  liberalization  in Thailand,  that is, with
an emphasize  on interest  rates,  foreign exchange  liberalization,  and  scope of operations.  They argue that  in general  there
was  deregulation  and  an  increase  in overal  competition,  especially  from the  standpoint  of commercial  banks.  It  seems
that commercial bank time deposit rates were partially deregulated  by June 1989 and on-lending rates  by 1993,  hence with
a lag.  They  also  provide evidence  that suggests  that the spread  between  commercial  bank  deposit rates  and  on-lending
prime rates narrowed  from 1986-1990,  though it increased somewhat thereafter,  to June 1995.  Likewise  there was apparently
greater competition  from finance companies,  and the gap between deposit  and share rates narrowed  across these two types
of institutions,  as did on-lending  rates.  Thai domestic  rates in general  approached  from above  international,  LIBOR rates.
Most  of the regulations  concerning  scope of operations,  including  new  licenses,  the holdmg  of equity, and the  opening  of
off-shore international  bank facihties are  dated March  1992 at the earliest.  See also Klinhowhan  (1999)  for further details.
2for  a variety of occupational  structures,  i.e.  firms  of various sizes,  e.g.,  with  and without  labor,  and  at
various levels of capitalization.  It has a general  (approximated)  production  technology,  one which allows
labor  share to vary.  In addition,  the household occupational  choice  has a closed  form solution  that can
easily be estimated.  Finally,  it features a dual economy  development  model  which has antecedents  going
back to Lewis  (1954)  and  Fei and Ranis  (1964),  and thus it captures several  widely observed  aspects
of the  development  process:  industrialization  with persistent  income  differentials,  a slow decline  in the
subsistence sector, and an eventual increase in wages, all contributing to growth with changing inequality.
Our extension  of the LEB model has two sectors,  one without intermediation  and the other allowing
borrowing and lending at a market clearing interest rate.  The intermediated sector is allowed to expand
exogenously  at the  observed  rate  in the  Thai data,  given  initial  participation  and  the  initial observed
distribution  of wealth.  Of  course  in  other  contexts  and  for  many  questions  one  would  like financial
deepening  to  be endogenous
4. But here  the exogeneity  of financial  deepening  has  a peculiar,  distinct
advantage  because we can vary it as we like,  either to mimic the Thai data with its accelerated  upturns
in the  late 80's and early  90's, or  keep it flat providing a counterfactual experiment.  We can thus gauge
the consequences of these various  experiments  and compare  among them.  In short,  we can  do general
equilibrium  policy  analysis following  the seminal  work  of Lochner,  Heckman  and Taber  (1998), despite
endogenous  prices and an evolving  endogenous  distribution of wealth in a model where preferences  do
not aggregate
We use the explicit structure of the model as given in the occupation choice and investment decision
of households  to estimate certain parameters  of the model.  Key parameters  of the production  technology
used by firms and the distribution of entrepreneurial  talent in the population are chosen to maximize the
likelihood as predicted by the model of the transition into business given initial wealth.  This is done with
two distinct microeconomic  datasets,  one a series of nationally  representative  household  surveys (SES),
and the other gathered under a project  directed  by one  of the  authors,  with more  reliable estimates  of
wealth, the timing of occupation transitions,  and the use of formal and informal credit. Not all parameters
of the model  can be estimated  via maximum  likelihood.  The savings rate,  the differential  in the cost of
living,  and the exogenous technical  progress  in the subsistence sector are calibrated to try to match the
two decades of Thai growth  and observed  changes in inequality,  labor share,  savings and the number of
entrepreneurs.
As mentioned before, this structural, estimated version of the Thai economy can then be compared to
what would have happened if there had been no expansion  in the size of the intermediated sector.  Without
liberation,  at  estimated parameter  values  from both  datasets,  the model predicts  a dramatically  lower
growth -rate, high residual subsistence  sector, non-increasing  wages,  and,  granted, lower  and decreasing
inequality.  Thus financial  liberalization  appears  to be the  engine  of growth  it is sometimes  claimed to
be,  at least in  the context  of Thailand.
However,  growth and liberalization do have uneven consequences, as the critics insist. The distribution
of welfare gains and losses in these experiments  is not at all uniform, as there are various effects depending
on wealth and talent:  with liberalization,  savings earn interest, although this tends to benefit the wealthy
most.  On the  other hand,  credit  is available  to  facilitate  occupation  shifts and to finance  setup costs
and  investment.  Quantitatively,  there  is  a  striking  conclusion.  The primary  winners  from  financial
liberalization  are talented  but  low  wealth  would-be  entrepreneurs  who without  credit  cannot  go  into
business  at all or entrepreneurs  with very little capital  Mean gains from the winners range  from  60,000
4 See Greenwood  and  Jovanovic  (1990)  or Townsend  and Ueda  (2001).
3to 80,000 baht,  and the modal  gains from  6,000 to 25,000  baht, depending  on the dataset used  and the
calendar year.  To normalize and give more  meaning to these numbers,  the  modal gains ranges  from  17
to 34 percent  of the observed,  overall average  of Thai household income.
But there are also  losers.  Liberalization  induces an increase  in  wages  in latter  years,  and while this
benefits workers,  ceteris paribus,  it hurts entrepreneurs  as they  face  a higher  wage  bill.  The  estimated
welfare  loss in  both datasets  is approximately  115,000  baht.  This is a large  number,  roughly the same
order of magnitude as the observed  average income  of firm owners overall.  This fact suggests  a plausible
political  economy  rational for  (observed)  financial sector repressions.
Finally,  we use the estimated structure of the model to conduct two robustness checks.  First, we open
up the economy to the observed  foreign capital inflows.  These contribute to increasing growth,  increasing
inequality,  and an increasing  number of entrepreneurs,  but only  slightly,  since  otherwise the macro and
distributional  consequences  are quite similar to those of the closed  economy  with liberalization.  Indeed,
if we  change  the  expansion  to  grow  linearly  rather  than  as  observed  in  the  data,  the  model  cannot
replicate  the high  Thai  growth  rates  in  the late  80's  and early  90's,  despite  apparently  large capital
inflows at that time.  Second,  we allow informal  credit in the sector without  formal intermediation to see
if our characterization  of the dual  economy  with its no-credit sector  is too extreme.  We  find that at the
estimated parameters  it is not.  Changes attributed to access  to informal credit  are negligible.
The  rest  of the  paper  is organized  as follows.  In  Section  2  we  describe  the  LEB model  in  greater
detail.  In Section  3 we describe the core of the model  as given in  an occupational  choice map.  In Section
4 we discuss  the possibility of introducing  a credit liberalization.  In  Section 5 we turn to the maximum
likelihood  estimation  of seven  of the ten  parameters  of the  model from  micro  data,  whereas  Section  6
focuses  on the calibration  exercise  used to pin down  the last three parameters,  matching,  as explained,
more macro,  aggregate  data.  Section  7  reports  the simulations  at the estimated  and calibrated  values
for each  dataset.  Section  8  performs a sensitivity analysis of the  model around  the  estimated  and  the
calibrated parameters.  Section 9 delivers various measures of the welfare gains and losses associated with
the  liberalization.  Section  10 introduces  international  capital  inflows  and informal  credit  to the  model.
Finally,  Section  11  concludes.
2  Environment
The Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhard model (LEB for short) begins with a standard production function mapping
a capital input k and a labor input I at the beginning of the period into output q at the end of the period.
In the  original'  LEB  model,  and  in the numerical  simulations  presented  here,  this function  is taken to
be quadratic.  In particular,  it takes the  form
q  f (k,)  = ak  -I3k  2+akl  +61_  - LPl  (1)
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This quadratic  function can be viewed  as an approximation  to virtually  any production function and has
been  used in  applied  work6. This  function  also  facilitates  the  derivation  of closed  form  solutions and
allows labor share to vary over time.
'We  use the  functional  forms  contamned  in  the  1993  workng  paper,  although  the  published  version  contains  slight
modifications.
6See Griffin et al.  (1987)  and  references therein.
4Each firm also has a beginning-of-period  set-up or fixed cost x, and this setup cost is drawn at random
from a known  cumulative distribution H(x, m) with 0 < x  < 1. This distribution  is parameterized by the
number m:
H(x,m) = mx
2 + (1 - m)x,  m E [-1,1].  (2)
If m  =  0,  the  distribution  is  uniform;  if m  >  0  the  distribution  is  skewed  towards  low  skilled  or,
alternatively,  high x people, and the converse  arises when m < 0.  We do suppose this set up cost varies
inversely  with talent, that is,  it takes  both talent  and an initial investment  to start  a business  but they
are negatively correlated  More generally, the cumulative distribution H(x, m) is a crude way to capture
and allow estimation  of the distribution of talent in the population and is not an unusual specification  in
the industrial  organization literature
7, e.g,  Das et al.  (1998),  Veracierto  (1998).  Cost x is expressed in
the same units as wealth.  Every agent  is born  with an inheritance  or  initial wealth  b.  The distribution
of inheritances  in the population at date t is given by Gt(b): Bt -a  [0,1]  where  Bt c  R. 4+ is the changing
support of the distribution at date t.  The time argument  t makes explicit  the evolution  of Bt  and Ct over
time.  The beginning-of-period  wealth b and the cost  x are the only  sources of heterogeneity  among  the
population  These  are  modelled  as independent  of one  another  in the  specification  used  here,  and this
gives us the existence of a unique steady state.  If correlation between wealth and ability were allowed, we
could  have poverty traps,  as in Banerjee and Newman  (1993).  We  do recognize that in practice wealth
and ability may  be correlated.  In  related work,  Paulson and Townsend  (2001)  estimate  with the same
data as here a version of the Evans  and Jovanovic  (1989)  model  allowing the mean of unobserved ability
to be a linear function of wealth and education  They find the magnitude of both coefficients to be small
8.
All  units  of labor can  be hired at a common  wage  w, to be  determined  in equilibrium  (there is no
variation in skills  for wage work).  The only other technology is a storage  technology which  carries goods
from the  beginning to the end of the period at a return of unity.  This  would  put a lower  bound on the
gross interest  rate in the corresponding  economy  with credit  and in any event  limits the input  k firms
wish to utilize in the production  of output q,  even in the economy  without credit.  Firms operate in cities
and the associated entrepreneurs  and workers incur  a common cost of living  measured by the parameter
v,.
The choice problem of the entrepreneur  is presented  first.
7r(b,  ,w)=  maxk,L  f(k, I)-wl-k
s.  t.  kE[O,b- x,  I>0,  (3)
where  7r(b, x, w)  denotes the profits  of the firm  with initial wealth b,  without  subtracting the setup cost
x,  given wage  w.  Since credit  markets have  not yet  been introduced,  capital  input  k cannot  exceed the
initial  wealth  b less  the set  up cost x as in (3).  This is the key  finance  constraint  of the model.  It may
or may not  be binding  depending on  x,  b and w.  More  generally,  some firms may  produce,  but if wealth
b is low  relative to cost x, they may be constrained  in capital input  use k,  that is, for  constrained  firms,
wealth  b limits  input  k.  Otherwise  unconstrained  firms are  all alike and have  identical  incomes  before
netting out the cost x.  The capital  input k  can be zero but not negative.
7In extended  models  this would  be the analog  to the distribution of human  capital,  although  obviously  the education
investment  decision  is not modelled  here
SWe  also  estimate the  LEB model  for various  stratifications of wealth,  e g.,  above  and below  the median, to see how
parameter  m varies with wealth  This way, wealth and talent are allowed to be correlated.  Even though the point estimates
of m vary  significantly,  simulations with the different  estimates of m are roughly similar.
5Even though  all  agents  are  born  with  an inherited  nonnegative  initial wealth  b, not  everyone  need
be  a firm.  There  is also a subsistence agricultural  technology  with fixed  return  y. In the original  LEB
model everyone  is in this subsistence sector initially,  at a degenerate  steady state distribution of wealth.
For various subsequent  periods,  labor  can be hired  from this subsistence  sector, at subsistence  plus cost
of living,  thus w =  y  +.v  When everyone  has left this sector,  as either a laborer or an entrepreneur,  the
equilibrium  wage  will rise.  In the simulations we impose an initial distribution of wealth as estimated  in
the data and allow the parameter  y to increase at an exogenous imposed rate of  y,,, thus also increasing
the wage.
For  a household  with  a given  initial  wealth-cost  pair  (b, x)  and  wage  w,  the  choice  of occupation
reduces to an essentially static problem of maximizing  end-of-period  wealth W(b, x, w)  given in equation
(4):
a  + b  if a subsistence worker,
W(b,  ,  w)  =  w - v + b  if a wage earner,  (4)
ir(b, x,  w)-x - v + b  if a firm.
At the end of the period all agents take this wealth as given and decide how much to consume C and
how much to bequest B to their heirs, that is,
maxC,B  U(C, B)
s. t.  C+B=W  (5)
In the original LEB model and in simulations  here the utility  function is  Cobb-Douglas, that  is,
U(C,  B) = C-wBw.  (6)
This  functional  form  yields  consumption  and  bequest  decision  rules given  by constant  fractions  1 -
and w of the end-of-period  wealth,  and indirect  utility would  be linear  in wealth.  Parameter  w denotes
the bequest motive.  More general monotonic transformations of the utility function U(C, B) are feasible,
allowing  utility to be monotonically  increasing  but concave  in wealth.  In  any event,  the overall  utility
maximization  problem  is converted  into a simple  end-of-period  wealth  maximization problem.  If we do
not wish to take this short-lived generational overlap  too seriously,  we can interpret  the model as having
an exogenously  imposed myopic savings  rate w which  below we  calibrate against  the data.  We can then
focus our attention on the nontrivial  endogenous  evolution of the wealth distribution.
The key to both static and dynamic features of the model is a partition  of the equilibrium occupation
choice in (b, x) space into three regions:  unconstrained firms, constrained  firms,  and workers or subsisters.
These  regions  are  determined  by the  equilibrium  wage  w.  One can  represent  these  regions  as  (b, x)
combinations yielding the occupation choices of agents of the model,  using the exogenous  distribution of
costs H(x, m) at each  period along with the endogenous  and evolving  distribution Gt(b) of wealth b. The
population  of the economy  is normalized  so that the fractions  of constrained  firms, unconstrained  firms,
workers,  and subsisters  add to unity.  This implies that Gt(b) is a cumulative  distribution function.
An equilibrium  at any  date  t given the  beginning-of-period  wealth  distribution  Gt(b) is a wage  wot,
such that given  wt,  every agent  with wealth-cost  pair (b, z) chooses occupation  and savings to maximize
(4) and (5), respectively, and the wage wt clears the labor market in the sense that the number of workers,
subsisters  and firms adds  to unity.  As will be  made  clear below,  existence  and uniqueness are assured.
Because of the myopic nature of the bequest  motive, we  can often  drop explicit reference  to date t.
63  The Occupation Partition
For an individual  with beginning-of-period  wealth b facing  an equilibrium wage  w, there are two critical
skill levels xe(b, w) and xu(b, w) as shown in Figure  1 in page 39.  If this individual's skill level  x is higher
than xe (b, w), she becomes  a worker, whereas  if it is lower,  she becomes  an entrepreneur.  Finally,  if x is
lower than  xu(b, w) she becomes  an unconstrained  entrepreneur.
We proceed  to obtain the curves  xe (b,  w)  and zu (b,  w).  Naturally,  these are  related to optimal  input
choice  and  profitability.  Recall  that gross  profits  from  setting  up  a firm  are  equal  to 7r(b, z, w).  The
optimal choice  of labor I given capital  k(b, x, w)  is given  by
9
1(b, z  ) =  ek(b, x, w) + (E,-w)  (7)
p
Suppressing the arguments  (b, x), we can express profits and labor as a function of capital k given the
wage w,  namely,
r(k, w)  = f (k, 1(k, w))) - wl(k, w)) - k
- r  ]  .0~~+ r)  _0]+(
[  +  (  )]  2  1 P  +  2p
which  yields  a quadratic expression  in k.
We  define  z  as  the  maximum  fixed  cost,  such  that  for  any  x  >  xz,  the  agent  will  never  be an
entrepreneur.  More  formally,  and suppressing  the dependence  of profits on the wage  w,  xz is such that
x*= ir'-w,  where  7r'  =max  7r(k,w)  (9)
that is,  if x > z*,  the maximum income  as an entrepreneur  will  always be less than  w  and therefore the
agent is always  better off becoming  a worker.
Denote  by  b  the  wealth  level  of an entrepreneur  with  cost xz  such  that she  is just unconstrained.
That is
b=xz  +kU,  where  ku=argmax  7r(k,w)  (10)
By construction  b* is the wealth level such that for any wealth b > b' and x < xz, the household would
be both a firm and be unconstrained.  Therefore  by the definition  of x'(b, w)  as defining the firm-worker
occupation  choice  indifference  point,  x'(b, w)  =  x*  for  b >  b.  In addition,  since  xU(b, w)  is the  curve
separating  constrained  and  unconstrained  entrepreneurs,  xu(b, w)  = x  for  b > b* also  and  thus the two
curves  coincide.  Again,  see  Figure  1 in  page  39.  Notice  that  for  b >  b-  and  x  <  z-,  a firm is  fully
capitalized  at the  (implicit)  rate of return  in the backyard  storage  technology.  In this sense they  are
neoclassical  unconstrained  firms
9For  certain  combinations  of a,t and  p,  labor  demand could  actually  be  negative.  Lloyd-Ellis  and  Bernhard  did  not
consider these possibilities by assuming that t  > w, and a > 0, p > 0.  However,  one could envision  situations where C < w
and a > 0 in which case,  for low values of capital  k it may not  pay to use labor.  Still at the same parameters, if the capital
employed were large, then the expression  in (7) may be positive.  The intuition is that although labor is rather unproductive,
it  is complementary  to capital.  In this  paper,  however,  we follow  Lloyd-Ellis  and  Bernhard  and assume that such  cases of
negative  labor  do not arise.  Therefore,  capital and labor  demands will always  be  nonnegative.
7Now  we proceed to define  the occupational  choice  and  constrained/unconstrained  cutoffs for b < be.
We  begin  by  noting  that  for  b <  be,  the  agent  will  always  be  constrained  as  a firm  at  the  point of
occupational indifference  xe(b, w)  between  the choice of becoming  a worker  or an entrepreneur'0. This
fact  implies that  we can  use the constrained  capital  input  kC  = b - x  to determine  xe(b, w)  with the
additional restriction that xe(b, w) S b, because the  entrepreneur  must  have enough  wealth to afford  at
least the setup cost.
We  define the occupation  indifference  cost point x'(b, w) by  setting profits in  (8)  less the setup cost
equal to the wage.  In obvious notation,
w=7r(kc,w)-x,  k'=b-x.  (11)
This is  a quadratic expression  in x  which, given  b < b* yields the level  of x that  would make  an agent
indifferent  between  becoming  an  entrepreneur  and  worker,  again,  denoted  xe(b, w) 1.  It  is  the  only
nonlinear  segment  in Figure 1.
The above equation,  however,  does not restrict x to be lower than b. Define b, such that xe(b, w) = b.
For b < b in  Figure  1, xle (b, w) would exceed  b. Households  will not have the wealth to finance the setup
cost x, and are  forced to become  workers.  They are constrained on the extensive  margin'2. Henceforth,
we restrict  Xe(b, w)  to equal to b in this region,  b < b. Note as well that agents with b = xe(b, w)  will start
businesses  employing only  labor as they used up all their wealth financing the setup cost.  This captures
in an extreme  way the idea that small family owned firms use little capital.
4  lntroducing an intermediated  sector
A major  feature  of the baseline  model  is the credit  constraint  associated  with  the absence  of a capital
market.  For example,  a talented  person  (low x)  may not be  able to be  an entrepreneur  because  that
person cannot raise  the necessary funds to buy capital.  Thus the most obvious  variation to the baseline
model is to introduce  credit markets'3.
We  consider  an  economy  with  two sectors of a given  size,  one  open to credit.  Agents  born in this
sector can deposit their beginning-of-period  wealth in the financial  intermediary and  earn interest on it.
If they decide to become an entrepreneur,  they can borrow at the interest rate to finance  their fixed cost
x and capital investment  k.  Still, labor  (unlike capital)  is assumed to be mobile,  so that there is a unique
wage rate for the entire  economy,  common to both sectors.
Let us  now turn to the occupational  choice  of an individual  facing  the wage rate  w and the gross
interest rate R.  Each agent,  as before,  starts with an inheritance b and earns
'lIntuitively,  if the agent were not constrained,  it can be shown that  he would  strictly  prefer to be an entrepreneur than
a worker,  contradicting  the claim  Assume  that b  < b-  and  suppose the agent  is  not constrained.  Then,  x + k'  <  b or
*  < b-  -k'  =  x-. Given that lr'-  -x  =  w (from equation (9)),  it follows that ir'  - x  > w, hence the agent is not indifferent.
"See  Appendix B for the explicit solution.
12According  to the  model  we need  to restrict  the values  of x'  and  xe  to the range  of their imposed  domain,  namely
[0,1].  Note for example that if the previously  defined  x'(b, w)  were negative  at some wealth b,  everyone with that wealth b
would become  a worker.  Alternatively, if x'(b, w) crossed  1 then everyone with that wealth  b would be an entrepreneur.  We
therefore restrict  x'  and xl  to lie within these boundaries,  by letting them coincide with the  boundaries  {0,1}  otherwise.
1
3The model  is  at best  a  first step  in  making the distinction  between  agents  with  and without  access  to credit.  Here
we assume  that intermediation  is perfect  for a fraction of the population  and  nonexistent  for the other.  We do not model
selection  of customers by  banks, informational  asymmetries  nor varation in the underlying technologies.
8{  Y+  Rb as a subsister,
W(b, x, W,  R)  =  w -v  + Rb as a worker,  (12)
i7r(w, R) - Rx  - + Rb as an enterpreneur.
where  ir(w, R) is the gross profit  earned by an entrepreneur  when  the cost of capital  is R and wage  is w.
Notice these gross profits  iT(w, R) do  not depend on  wealth b nor setup  costs x.  Since  all entrepreneurs
operate  the  same  technology  f (k, I)  and face the  same  factor  prices,  they will  all  operate  at the same
scale  and demand  the same  (unconstrained)  amount of capital  k  and  labor 1, regardless  of their setup
cost x or wealth b. The problem  they solve is as follows:
7rU(w, R) = max f (k,  ) -wi-Rk  (13)
k,L
which yields the optimal choices
k  (w, R)= p(a-R)+u( -w)  and  lU(w,R)=  rku+(  w)  (14)
Note that  kU(w, R)  is  different  from the earlier  program  except when the interest rate  is R = 1.
Our next step is to determine  who  becomes entrepreneur  and who a worker  or subsister in  the inter-
mediated  sector.  All we have to do is to find the value of z(w, R)  at which an agent would  be indifferent
between  the two options.  Anybody who  has a setup cost greater than z(w, R) will be a worker  and vice
versa.  The occupational indifference  condition  is given by
w =  ru(w, R) - x  = f(ku, IU) -wlU  - R(kU +  x)  (15)
orf  k,u)-wu-R  -w
oz(w, R) = f(ku,LU)_wLu-RkU_W  (16)
It is clear that z(w, R) does  not depend on  initial wealth b, and it is decreasing  in the interest rate R.
Net aggregate deposits  in the financial  intermediary can be expressed as total wealth deposited  in the
intermediated  sector less credit  demanded  for capital and fixed costs:
I  Z(W,R)  ZE(W,R)
D(w, R) =  /  /  bdH(x, m)dGc(b)-  /  kudH(x, m) - xdH(x, m)  > 0  (17)
where  now Bc  denotes the support  for the  wealth  distribution  Gc in the intermediated  (C  for  credit)
sector.  For low levels  of aggregate wealth,  the amount  of deposits  will constrain  credit and the net will
be  zero.  However,  note that net  aggregate  deposits  can  be  strictly  positive  if there is  enough capital
accumulation,  in which case the savings and the storage  technology are equally productive,  both yielding
a gross return of R = 1. Implicit in the notation, each sector wealth distribution integrates to its relative
size in the aggregate  economy.  More  formally,
dGc(b) + j  dGNC(b) = 1  (18)
where  unity is the normalized  population  size.
The labor market clearing condition  can be written as
Ec(w,R) + ENC(W) + L d(w, R) + LdC(w) + Sc(w, R) + SNc(w) = 1  (19)
9where  the  mass  of entrepreneurs  in  the  intermediated  and  non-intermediated  sectors,  EC  and  ENC
respectively,  can be expressed as
i(w,R)
Ec(w, R)  =  j  j  dH(z,m)dGc(b)  and  (20)
tr2  s(b,W)
ENC(W)  =  J  |  dH(x, m)dGNC(b).  (21)
The mass of workers  in each sector is given by
i  ~(w,R)
L  d(w, R)  =  1'(w, R)dH(x, m)dGc(b)  and  (22)
d  j.(b,w)
LNC(W)  =  J  J  I(b,x,w)dH(x,m)dGNc(b),  (23)
where  the superscript  d denotes labor  demand by the  entrepreneurs.  Labor  demand  l(b, x, w)  is  given
in equation  (7)  and  lU(w, R)  is in equation  (14).  Finally  Sc and SNC  denote the potentially  positive
fraction  of the population  in subsistence  in each sector.  The factor prices R and w can be found solving
the  market  clearing  conditions  (17)  and  (19).  Specifically,  an  equilibrium  at any date  t  given wealth
distributions  Gc,t(b)  and  GNC,t(b), is  a wage  wt and an interest  rate  Rt, such that  every  agent  with
wealth-cost pair (b, z)  choose in the restricted  sector an occupation to maximize  (4) given wt  and in the
liberalized sector  an occupation to maximize  (12) given the wt  and Rt,  the interest  rate Rt satisfies  (17)
in the sense that in the liberalized sector  aggregate deposits are equal  or larger than capital  demand and
the wage wt satisfies (19) so that the numbers of subsisters, workers  and entrepreneurs across sectors add
to unity.  Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is again  assured.
5  Estimation  from Micro data
Although the original LEB model without  intermediation is designed to explain growth and inequality in
transition to a steady state, there are recurrent  or repetitive features.  Specifically,  the decision problem
of every household  at every date depends only on the individual beginning-of-period  wealth b and cost x
and on the economy-wide  wage w.  Further,  if the initial wealth b and the wage w are observable, while x
is not, then the likelihood that an individual will be an entrepreneur can be determined entirely as in the
occupation partition diagram,  from the curve z'(b, w)  and the exogenous distribution of talent  H(x, m).
That is, the probability that an individual household with initial wealth b will be an entrepreneur is given
by H(ze(b, w), m),  the likelihood that cost  x  is less than  or equal to xz(b, w).  The residual probability
1 - H(xe(b, w), m) dictates the likelihood that the individual  household  will be a wage earner.
The fixed cost z takes on values in the unit interval and yet enters additively into the entrepreneur's
problem defined at wealth b. Thus setup costs can be large or small relative to wealth depending on how
we  convert from  1997 Thai baht into LEB units14. We therefore  search over different scaling factors  s in
order to map wealth data into the model units.  Related, we pin down the subsistence  level -y in the model
by using the estimated  scale  s to  convert to LEB model units  the counterpart  of subsistence measured
in Thai baht in the data, corresponding to the earnings of those in subsistence  agriculture.
1
4The relative magnitude of the fixed costs will drop  as wealth evolves over time.
10Now let a denote the vector of parameters of the model related to the production function and scaling
factor,  that  is,  a  =  (f, a,p,a,  ,s).  Suppose we  had a sample of n  households,  and  let y,  be a zero-
one indicator  variable  for  the observed entrepreneurship  choice  of household  i.  Then with the  notation
x'(b, 1,  w)  for the point on the xe(b,  w) curve for  household i with wealth b,, at parameter  vector 0 with
wage  w,  we can write the explicit  log likelihood  of the entrepreneurship  choice  for the n households  as
1n
Ln(9,m) = -EylnH[xe(btIO, w),ml + (1 -y,)ln{I  - H[xe(b, 1, w),m]}  (24)
t=1
The parameters  over which to search are again the production parameters  (,B, a, p, a,  (),  the scaling factor
s and the skewness m of H(., m).
Intuitively,  however,  the production  parameters  in vector  9 cannot  be  identified from a pure  cross-
section  of data at  a point in time  For if we return to the  decision  problem of an entrepreneur  facing
wage w,  we recall that the labor  hire decision given by equation  (7) is a linear function of capital k.  Then
substituting l (k, w)  back into the production function as in equation  (8), we obtain a relationship between
output and capital  with a constant term, a linear term in k, and a quadratic term in k.  Essentially, then,
only three parameters  are determined,  not five.
If data on capital  and labor demand at the firm  level were available,  we could solve the identification
problem  by directly estimating  the  additional linear relation  l(k)  given in equation  (7).  This would  give
us  two  more parameters  thus  obtaining  full identification.  Unfortunately,  these  data are not available.
However,  equation  (8) suggests  that we can  fully identify  the production  parameters  by exploiting the
variation  in  the  wages  over  time  observed  in  the data.  The Appendix  shows  in  detail  the  coefficients
estimated  and how the production parameters  are recovered.
The derivatives  of the likelihood  in equation  (24) can  be determined  analytically,  and then with the
given observations of a database,  standard maximization routines can be used to search for the maximum
numerically'".  The standard errors of the estimated parameters  can be computed by bootstrap methods
using  100 draws  of the original  sample with replacement.
It is  worthwhile  mentioning that  for  some  initial predetermined  guesses,  the routine  converged  to
different  local  maxima.  However, all  estimates using  initial guesses  around  a neighborhood  of any such
estimate,  converged to the same estimate.  The multiplicity of local maxima may be due to the computa-
tional  methods available  rather than the non-concavity  of the objective function  in certain  regions.  See
also the experience  of Paulson  and Townsend"
6 (2001)  with LEB  and other structural models.
We run this maximum hkehhood  algorithm with two different data bases.  The first and primary data
base is the widely  used and highly  regarded  Socio-Economic  Survey'
7 (SES) conducted by the National
Statistical  Office  in  Thailand.  The sample  is nationally  representative,  and it  includes eight  repeated
cross-sections  collected  between  1976 and  1996.  The sample  size  in each cross  section:  11,362  in  1976,
11,882 in  1981,  10,897  in  1986,  11,046 in 1988,  13,177 in  1990,  13,459 in 1992,  25,208 in 1994 and 25,110
in  1996.  Unfortunately,  the data do not constitute  a panel, but when stratified  by age of the household
head, one is left with a substantial sample.  As in the complementary work of Jeong and Townsend (2000),
we restrict  attention to relatively  young  households,  aged 20-29,  whose  current assets might  be regarded
somewhat  exogenous to their recent  choice  of occupation.  We also  restrict  attention  to households who
had  no  recorded  transaction  with  a financial  institution  in the month  prior  to the  interview,  a crude
1'1n  particular,  we used the MATLAB  routine fmincon  starting from a variety of predetermined guesses
"See  their technical  appendix for  more information  about the estimation  technique  and its drawbacks
'
7See  Jeong(1999)  for details or its use  in Deaton and Paxson  (2000)  or Schultz (1997).
11estimate  of  lack  financial  access,  as assumed  in  the  LEB model.  However,  the  SES  does  not record
directly measures  of wealth.  From the ownership of various  household  assets, the value of the house and
other rental assets, Jeong (1999) estimates a measure of wealth based on Principal Components Analysis
which essentially estimates  a latent variable  that can best explain the overall  variation in the ownership
of the house  and other household assets
18.
We use the observations  for the first available  years,  1976 and 1981,  to obtain full identification  as
the wage varied over these two periods.  The sample  consists of a total of 24,433 observations  with 9,028
observations  from  1976 and 15,405 from  1981.
The second  dataset  is a specialized  but substantial  cross sectional  survey  conducted  in Thailand in
May  1997  of 2880  households
19 The sample  is  special  in that  it was restricted  to two  provinces  in the
relatively poor semi arid Northeast  and two provinces in the more industrialized central corridor around
Bangkok.  Within each province,  48  villages were selected  in a stratified clustered  random sample.  Thus
the sample  excludes urban households.  Within each village  15 households  were  selected at random.  The
advantage of this survey is that the household questionnaire  elicits an enumeration of all potential assets
(household,  agricultural  and business),  finds out what is currently owned, and if so when it was acquired.
In this way, as in Paulson and Townsend  (2001),  we create an estimate of past wealth, specifically wealth
of the household  6 years  prior to the 1997  interview,  1991.  The  survey  also asks  about  current  and
previous  occupations  of the head,  and  in this way it creates estimates  of occupation  transitions, that is
which  of the households  were not operating their own  business before  1992,  five years prior to the  1997
interview,  and started a business in the following five years.  Approximately  21 percent of the households
made  this transition  in  the  last  five  years  and 7  percent  between  five  and  ten  years  ago.  A  business
owner  in the Townsend-Thai  data is a store owner, shrimp  farmer,  trader or mechanic
2 0. Among other
variables,  the survey  also  records  the current  education  level of household members;  the history  of use
of the  various  possible financial  institutions:  formal  (commercial  banks,  BAAC  and  village funds)  and
informal  (friends  and  relatives,  landowners,  shopkeepers  and moneylenders);  and  whether  households
claimed to be currently  constrained  in the operation of their business.
21'22
Since  the LEB model  is  designed  to explain  the  behavior of those agents without  access to credit,
we restrict  our sample  to those  households  that reported having  no  relationship  with  any formal  or
informal  credit  institution,  another  strength of the  survey
2 3. A disadvantage  of the second dataset  is
that  as a single cross section, there  is no temporal variation  in wages.  Thus,  we identify the production
parameters  by dividing the observations  into two subsamples containing the households in the northeast
18See  Jeong  (1999)  and Jeong and Townsend  (2000) for details.
1
9Robert  M.  Townsend is the principal  investigator  for this survey.  See Townsend et al.  (1997).
2 0Reassuringly,  Table 1C in Paulson and Townsend  (2001) shows that the initial investment necessary to open a business
is the roughly same in both regions among the most common  types of businesses
2 1The percentage  of households  m non-farm businesses  is  13 percent  and 28  percent  in the central vs  northeast regions.
The fraction of the population  with access to formal credit  (from commercial banks or BAAC)  is 34 percent and 55 percent
for  non-business  vs  business,  respectively,  in  the  northeast  region,  and  48 percent  and  73 percent,  respectively,  for the
central  region.
22Paulson and Townsend (2001)  provide a much more extensive discussion of the original data, the derivation of variables
to match those of the LEB model, additional  maximum likelihood  estimates of the LEB model and the relationship of LEB
estimates to those of various other  models  of occupation  choice.  However, the maximum likelihood  procedure  in Paulson
and Townsend (2001)  is different  to the one discussed here in that no attempt  is made to recover the underlying production
parameters.
23These households, however, could have borrowed from friends and relatives,  although the bulk of the borrowmg through
this source consists of consumption  loans rather than business  investments.
12and central  regions,  exploiting  regional  variation  in  the  wages
24. The  final  sample  consists  of a total
of 1272  households with 707 households  from the northeast  region  and 565 households  from the central
region.
Figure 2  in  page 39 displays  the  occupational  map  generated  using the  estimated  parameters.  For
the SES  dataset, observations  in  1981  seem to be less  constrained  than those  in  1976, naturally  as the
country was growing  and  wealth was higher.  For the Townsend-Thai  dataset, the central region appears
to be  less credit  constrained than the Northeast,  reflecting  perhaps the  fact that the central  region is
more prosperous.
Table 1 reports the estimated  parameters  as well as the standard errors
25. The parameter  y for both
datasets was found by multiplying an estimate of the subsistence  level from the data by the scaling factor
estimated.  For  the SES data,  we used the  mean  income  of farmers  in  1976  which  amounted  to 19,274
baht.  Analogously,  we used  the average  income  of workers  in the Northeast  region  without  access  to
credit  as reported in the Townsend-Thai  data, or  10,727 baht.  The wage  for the two  time periods  in the
model units at the estimated scaling  factor  s were W 76 =  0.048 and w8l =  0.053  for the SES dataset and
WNE  = 0 016  and wc = 0.037  for  the two  regions  in the Townsend-Thai  dataset.  The maximized  value
of the likelihood function obtained using the SES data was -8,233.92  whereas the Townsend-Thai  dataset
yielded a value of -616.92.
Table  1:  MLE Results
SES  Townsend-Thai
Coefficient  S  E.  Coefficient  S E
Scalmng Factor
sa  1.4236  0.00881  1.4338  0.03978
Subsistence Level
-y  0.02744  0.00119  0.01538  0.00408
F7:red Cost Dtstributon
m  -0 5933  0 05801  0.00559  0.17056
Technology
ca  0.54561  0.06711  0.97545  0.00191
1B  0.39064  0.09028  0.0033  0.00013
p  0.03384  0.00364  0.00966  0.00692
or  0.1021  0.02484  0.00432  0.00157
0.2582  0.03523  0.12905  0.04146
Number of Obs.  24,433  1,272
Log-Likelihood  -8,233.92  -616.92
The parameter  value  and standard  error reported  are multiplied by a factor of 106.
24Unfortunately,  estimating a  model  that, features  a unique wage  by exploiting  the geographical  variation  m the wage
observed  in  the data  is a  contradiction.  Of course  costly migration  could  be introduced  but we do not take that explicit
approach  here.  We draw  some confidence  from  the fact that these are secondary  data and  we are comparing its estimates
to those  from the SES dataset, with  its temporal  variation in  wages consistent  with the estimated model.
2 5Note that e >  "u76, C >  W8i  and ( > wNE, C >  wC  and  p >0 , a >  0  for  both datasets  as required  in Footnote 9
13From the standard errors one can  construct confidence  intervals.  Indeed,  they  reflect  the curvature
of the  likelihood  function  at the point  estimates  and hence  they  also  reveal  the  potential  for  errors  in
the  convergence  to a global  maximum.  The magnitude  of the standard  errors,  however,  tell  us  little
about how  sensitive  the dynamics of the  model are to the  parameters.  In  Section  8  below we  address
this  issue by performing a sensitivity analysis.  It  is also interesting that both estimates of m fall  within
the permitted boundaries.  Related,  the SES data estimate of the parameter  m implies  a distribution  of
talent more skewed towards  low cost agents.
6  (Calibration
We still need to pin down the cost of living v and the "dynamic"  parameters,  namely, the savings rate w
and the subsistence  income growth rate  Ygr.  One way to determine  these parameters is calibration:  look
for the best v, w and 'yr combination according to some metric relating the dynamic data to be matched
with the simulated data.
In this section we first discuss the Thai macro dynamic data that will be used to calibrate the model
and then discuss some issues concerning  the calibration  itself.
6.1  Data
The Thai economy  from  1976-1996  displayed  nontrivial  growth  with increasing  (and then  decreasing)
inequality.  LEB and related models are put forward in the literature as candidate qualitative explanations
for  this growth  experience.  Here  we  naturally  go one  step further  and ask whether  the LEB model  at
some parameter values can match  quantitatively  the actual Thai economy,  focusing  in particular  on the
time  series  of growth,  labor  shares,  savings  rates,  fraction  of entrepreneurs,  and  the Gini  measure  of
income  inequality.  The actual Thai data are summarized  in Table  2 in the Appendix.
The data show an initially high net growth rate of roughly 8 percent in the first three years.  This then
fell to a more modest  4 percent  up through  1986.  The period 1986-1994  displayed  a relatively  high  and
sustained  average growth  of 8.43 percent,  and within  that, from  1987-1989  the net growth rate  was 8.83
percent.  During this same period,  the Thai economy  GDP  growth rate  was the highest  in the world at
10.3 percent.  These high  growth periods have attracted  much attention.  Labor  share is relatively stable
at 0.40 and rising after  1990, to 0.45 by 1995.  A trend from the  1990-1995  data was  used to extrapolate
labor share  for  1996.  Savings  as a percent  of national  income  were roughly  22  percent  from the  initial
period to  1985.  Savings  then increased  after  1986  to 33  percent,  in  the  higher  growth period.  These
numbers,  though typical of Asia, are relatively high.  The fraction of entrepreneurs is remarkably  steady,
though  slightly increasing,  from  14 percent  to  18  percent.  The  Gini coefficient  stood at 0.42 in the  1976
SES  survey and increased  more or less steadily  to 0.53 in  1992.  Inequality decreased  slightly in both the
1994 and  1996 rounds,  to 0.50.  This downward  trend mirrors the rise in the labor share during the same
period,  and both may be explained by the increase in the wage rate.  This level of inequality  is relatively
high,  especially  for  Asia,  and rivals  many  countries  in  Latin America  (though dominated  as  usual by
Brazil).  Other measures  of inequality,  e.g.,  Lorenz,  display similar orders of magnitude within  Thailand
over time and relative to other countries
26.
26The mterested reader will find a more detailed explanation  in  Jeong (1999).
14The fraction of population with access to credit in  1976 was estimated at 6 percent and increased by
1996 to 26  percent.  The data also  reveal that  as measure of financial  deepening,  it  grew slowly  in the
beginning and from  1986  grew more sharply.  We recognize that at best this measure of intermediation is
a limited measure  of what we would like to have ideally, and it  seems likely we are off in levels.
6.2  Issues in the calibration method
6.2.1  Financial Liberalization
We begin with the standard,  benchmark  LEB model, shutting down credit altogether.  We then consider
an  alternative  intermediated  economy,  with two sectors,  one  open  to credit  and saving.  Only  labor  is
mobile,  hence a  unique  wage rate,  whereas  capital  cannot  move to the other sector.  In other  words,  a
worker  residing in the non intermediated  sector may find a job in the credit sector,  even though  she will
not be able to deposit her wealth  in the financial  intermediary.  The relative size
27 of each sector is taken
to be exogenous  and changing over time given  by the  fraction  of people with access to credit reported in
Table  2 in the Appendix.  As mentioned,  this is our  key measure  of liberalization.
6.2.2  Initial  wealth distribution
Relevant for dynamic simulations is the initial 1976 economy-wide  distribution of wealth
28. As mentioned
before,  Jeong (1999)  constructs  a measure  of wealth  from  the SES data using observations  on  household
assets and the value of owner occupied  housing units.
6.2.3  The metric
Any calibration  exercise requires a metric to assess how well the model matches the data.  As an example,
the business  cycles  literature  has focused on  models  that  are  able to generate  plausible  co-movements
of certain  aggregate  variables  with output.  Almost  by definition,  the metric  requires  that the economy
displayed  by these  models  be in  a steady  state.  Even though  the economy  we consider  here eventually
reaches  a steady state, we  are interested  in the  (deterministic)  transition to it, thus the metric put forth
as our objective  function  suffers  from being somewhat  ad  hoc.  In particular,  we consider  the normalized
sum of the period by period squared deviations of the predictions of the model from the actual Thai data
for the five  time series
29 displayed  in Table  2 in  the Appendix.  We  normalize the deviations  in the  five
variables by dividing them by their  corresponding  means from the Thai data.  More formally,
5  1996  Z:F  - e  2
C=E  E  W  at  t  (25)
s=l t=1976  2z.
27We  assume that  the intermediated  sector,  with  its distribution  of wealth,  is scaled  up period by  period  according  to
the exogenous credit  expansion.  Alternatively,  we could have sampled from the no-credit  sector distribution of wealth and
selected  the correspondung  fraction  to the exogenous  expansion,  but the  increase  is small  and  his would  have  made  little
difference  in the numerical  computations.
r8Smce this estimated measure of wealth  is likely to differ in scale and units to the wealth reported  in the Townsend-Thai
data,  we allow  for a different scaling factor to convert SES wealth into the model  units.  In other  words, we use  two scaling
factors when  we calibrate  the model  using  the parameters  estimated  with the Townsend-Thai  data.  One  is estimated  with
ML techniques and converts  wealth and incomes reported  in the data,  whereas the other is calibrated  and converts the SES
wealth measure  used to  generate the economy-wide  initial distribution.
2 9Note  that  in computing  the growth rate we  lose one observation,  so  the time  index in the  formula given  in  (25)  runs
from  1977 to 1996 for the growth rate statistic.
15where  zJ  denotes the variable  s, t denotes  time, and w,t  is the weight given  to the variable  s in year t.
In order to focus on a particular period,  more weight  may  be given to those years.  Analogously,  all the
weight  may be set to one variable  to assess  how well  the model  is able to replicate it alone.  All weights
are re-normalized  so that they add up to unity.  Finally,  sim and  ec denote  respectively  "simulated"  and
"Thai economy",  and M.,  denotes the variable  zJm ean from the Thai data.
We search over the cost of living v, subsistence  level growth rate -g,  and the bequest motive parameter
w  using a grid of 203  points or combinations of parameters 3 0.
All the statistics but the savings rate have natural counterparts in the model.  We consider  "savings"
the fraction of end-of-period  wealth bequested to the next generation.  The savings rate then is computed
by  dividing this measure of savings by net income3l.
7  Resullts
In this section we present the simulation results using the calibrated  and estimated  parameters from both
data sets.
7.1  Simulations  using SES Data Parameters
We begin with the original LEB model without liberalization.  If all periods and all variables are weighted
equally, the parameters which minimize the squared error metric are v = 0.079,  w = 0.479 and 7g.  = 0.042.
Figure  3 in page 40 displays the model simulations  against the actual Thai data displayed earlier.
The  figures show  how the  model fails  to explain  the levels  and changes  in roughly  all variables.  In
the simulation, the growth  rate of income  is  flat  at roughly  2 percent.  Growth  is driven  mainly  by the
exogenous  growth  of the  subsistence  level which  is set  at  4.2  percent  per year.  Overall,  the economy
shrinks in the early periods, and then by 1983  it grows at the wage level32. The simulated  labor share is
able to roughly match the trend displayed in the data, although it is always higher in levels.  The simulated
savings  rate is decreasing  at first and then  slightly increasing,  always at  a higher  level than  the actual
data.  Entrepreneurship  in the model  is  somewhat  low.  The  Gini  coefficient  is always  decreasing  and
terribly low, in contrast to the first increasing and then decreasing  pattern that the Thai data exhibits.
If we had tried to match the growth rate alone, we do somewhat better on that dimension.  In fact, we
are able to replicate the low growth - high growth phases  seen in the data.  Figure 4  in page  41 displays
the model simulations when we restrict attention  to the growth rate.  The calibrated parameters here are
v =  0.074,  w = 0.7 and -g,  =  .1. The improvement in the growth rate comes at the expense of increasing
the model's savings rate above one  from  1985 onwards,  far above the actual one.  Labor share  increases
sharply in  the model, but not in the data.  The income  Gini  coefficient  and the fraction of entrepreneurs
are very poorly matched as both drop to zero.  The reason for  such drastic macroeconomic  aggregates  is
30As mention  earlier, when we use the Townsend-Thai  data, we also search  over a grid of 20 scaling factors for the mitial
distribution  of wealth.
31More formally we can express the savings rate  (in an economy  without credit)  as
Savings Rate =  fB f'l  W(b, x, w)dH(x, m)dG(b)  (26)
f5 l f0 Y (b,  x, w)dH(x, m)dG(b)
where income Y(b, x, w)  is given by W(b, x,  W) = Y(b, x, w) +b as expressed  in equation  (4).  Note that for some parameters,
the savings rate  may be larger than  one.
32Smce the cost of living v  is roughly  3 times the subsistence  income -y, wage growth  rate wvll always be  lower than 7yrg
16the choice  of model parameters  which try to match  the growth rate  of income.  The subsistence  sector
is so profitable  relative to setting up a business that by  1988  all entrepreneurial  activity disappears  and
everyone  in  the subsistence  sector  earns the  same amount.  It is  clear that focusing  on the growth rate
alone has perverse effects on the rest of statistics
We now modify the benchmark model to mimic part of the Thai reality,  allowing an exogenous increase
in  the intermediated  sector  from 6  percent  to 26  percent  from  1976-1996  as described  in Table 2  in the
Appendix.  We weight  each  year and  all the  variables  equally and search  again  for the  parameters  v, w
and 7gr,  allowing the best fit of the five variables.  The parameters  are M  = 0.026,  w = 0.321 and  ygr  =  0.
The corresponding  graphs are presented in  Figure 5,  page 42.
The modified intermediated  model's explanation  of events differs sharply from that of the benchmark
without an  intermediated  sector.  Now the  model  is able to generate  simulated time  series  which track
the Thai economy  more accurately.  In the model, the growth rate of income  is again lower  than that of
the Thai economy.  The model still  starts with negative  growth  until 1984.  The  initial phase of negative
growth  comes  from  an  initial  overly high  aggregate  wealth  in  the economy.  But growth  jumps to  5.4
percent by  1987.  This high growth  phase  comes  from the rapid  expansion  of credit  during  those years.
Finally,  the  growth  rate  declines  after  1987  monotonically,  driven  by the imposed  diminishing  returns
in  the  production  function.  The model  matches  remarkably  well  the  labor  share  levels  and  changes,
especially  after  1990  where they both  show a steady  rise.  The savings  rate  is  only  closely  matched  for
the period  1987-1996.  The model also predicts a slightly decreasing  fraction  of entrepreneurs  until  1985
and then a steady increase from  8.7 percent  in 1985  to 16 1 percent  in  1995, resembling  more the actual
levels.  Finally,  the  Gini  coefficient  folows  a  slightly  decreasing,  then  slightly  increasing,  and  finally
sharply  decreasing  trend,  starting  at  .481  in  1976,  then  .377 by  1985,  increasing  to  .451  by  1991  and
declining again to .284 by 1996.  Beneath these macro  aggregates  lie the model's underpinnings.  Growth
after  1985  is driven by a steady decline out of the subsistence sector,  with income from earned wages and
from  profits steadily  increasing  to 1990.  Profits per entrepreneur are particularly  high.  Then,  with the
subsistence sector depleted  entirely,  the wage increases faster,  and profits begin to decrease.  Thus labor
share picks up and inequality  falls.
To  isolate the role of credit,  we  can consider  the same economy,  at  the same  parameter  values,  but
without  the  intermediated  sector.  In  such a no-credit  benchmark  economy,  roughly  80 percent  of the
labor force are still subsisters by  1996.  In fact,  this benchmark  model  is only  capable  of replicating the
savings rate.  It under-predicts  labor share,  the Gini coefficient,  and the fraction  of entrepreneurs.  Labor
share starts (low) at  7.7 percent  and rises to 29.8 percent by  1988.  The Gini  coefficient declines  from .462
in  1976 to .238  by  1988.  From then onwards,  both simulated series remain  constant  until  1996.  Income
growth  is very  badly matched,  starting  low initially  and  converging  from  negative to zero  growth  rate
by  1996.  The negative growth  comes from  a relative  abundance  of wealth  in the  economy:  households
eat  and save that wealth  as they  move toward  the subsistence  growth rate of zero.  We  conclude  then
that the credit liberalization  is solely  responsible for the growth experience that the intermediated  model
displays.
7.2  Simulations  with Parameters  from the Townsend-Thai  Data
The  simulation  generated  from  the  economy  with  no  access  to  intermediation  at the  Townsend-Thai
parameters,  displays similar characteristics  to the  one using  the SES  data parameters  and hence  is not
reported.
17We now turn attention  to the  intermediated  economy  at these  parameter  values.  If we  weight  each
year  and all  the variables equally,  the calibrated  parameters  are v  = 0.004,  w =  0.267  and -ygr  =  .006.
The scaling factor chosen for the initial distribution  is  15 percent  of the one used to convert wealth using
in the ML estimation.  The corresponding  graphs are presented  in Figure 6,  page 43.
The model here also  does well at explaining the levels and changes in all  variables,  even better than
above with the SES data.  Striking  in particular  is the growth  rate of income, which  although somewhat
low in  levels,  tracks the  Thai growth experience  well.  The model  also does remarkably  wel  in matching
labor share and the Gini measure of inequality.  It under-predicts,  however,  the fraction of entrepreneurs,
although  it  is  able to  replicate  a  positive  trend.  As  usual,  the  model  features  a flatter  savings  rate
although  it matches  well the  last subperiod,  1988-1996.  Economy  wide  growth  is  driven primarily  by
growth  in the  intermediated sector.  That  is where  the bulk of the  economy's  entrepreneurs  lie and a
relatively  high number of workers,  from both  the intermediated and non-intermediated  sector.
8  Sensitivity Analysis of MILE  parameters
We address the robustness  of the model in two ways.  First, we change one parameter  at a time and check
whether  the new simulation  differs significantly  from the benchmark one.  Alternatively,  we could see how
sensitive the model  is to changes  in all the estimated  parameters at the same time.  We now explain each
approach  in detail.
From  the estimated  parameters  and their standard  errors,  confidence  intervals  can be constructed
3 3.
One can then set one parameter at a time to its confidence  interval lower or upper bound while fixing the
rest of the parameters at their original values.  Keeping the calibrated  parameters  also fixed, one can then
simulate the economy.  When we do this, it becomes clear that the simulations  are more sensitive to some
parameters  than others.  The reason  is that some parameters  are close to the value that would  make the
constraints  described  in Footnote 9 bind.  When we perturb these parameters  by changing them to their
confidence  interval  bounds,  we approach  the constraints,  so  the model  delivers  very different  dynamics.
This  is especially  true for the parameters  p and (.  In fact, the lower  bound of the confidence  interval  for
p obtained from the Townsend-Thai  dataset violates some of the restrictions that the model must satisfy
to  be well-behaved.  Indeed,  the unconstrained  labor demand  is zero,  in  which  case no  agent  wiUl  ever
want to become an entrepreneur  regardless of his setup cost x.
When  we change  the setup  distribution  parameter  m  beyond  its  confidence  interval  to its extreme
values  of  [-1, 1],  and still fix  the rest  of the parameters,  we  obtain somewhat  more  distorted  pictures
than if m  were contained  in  the confidence  interval.  However,  we do not obtain  the cycles  discussed  by
Lloyd-EUis  and Bernhardt.
From the confidence  intervals  of the estimated parameters,  we draw  at random 5,000 different  sets of
parameter  values.  It turns out, by  chance, that  none violated the conditions  in Footnote  9.  Notice  that
since  we also vary the scale parameter  s, we are examining sensitivity to the  initial wealth  distribution
when  we  use  the  SES dataset.  Fixing  the  calibrated  parameters  at  their  original  level,  we  run  5,000
simulations  for each the SES and the Townsend-Thai  dataset.  We then  compute the mean and standard
deviation at each  date over  these  5,000 simulations  of each  of the five  variables.  Figures  5  and  6 also
display  (in dots) the  95 percent  confidence  intervals around the mean.
Figure  5  shows  that  income  growth,  the savings  rate  and the  fraction  of entrepreneurs  are  quite
33We construct standard  asymptotic  95% confidence  intervals  using the norrnal distribution.
18insensitive to changes in the parameters  within the 95 percent  confidence  intervals.  Labor share  and the
Gini  coefficient  can potentially  display  different  dynamics  judging by the wider  bands,  especially  after
1989  at the peak  of the  credit  expansion.  The  reason  for this  diversity  of paths depends  on  whether
or  not the  subsistence  sector was  completely  depleted  by  1996.  If such was the  case,  then  demand  for
workers  would  drive up wages,  increasing  the  labor share  and reducing  inequality.  If, on the contrary,
such depletion  did not occur,  labor share would remain fairly stable  and inequality could increase
34.
Similar to the SES data results, the confidence  intervals in Figure 6 show that the savings rate and the
fraction  of entrepreneurs  are robust  to changes in the parameters.  Income  growth  is more sensitive than
its SES analogue,  especially  in the earlier  years,  1976-1980  and  after  1990.  However,  the bands  shrink
during  the period  of high  growth.  This  indicates  that  all parameter  combinations  delivered  this  high
growth  phase.  Finally labor share and the Gini coefficient  were  very simular  to their SES counterparts.
We thus conclude  that with the exceptions enumerated  above, the model is robust to changes in the
estimated parameters within their confidence  intervals.  We are yet more confident that the upturn of the
Thai economy  in the late 1980's could  be attributed to the expansion  of the financial sector.
9  Welfare  Comparisons
We seek a  measure of the welfare impact of the observed  financial  sector liberalization.  As there  can be
general equilibrium effects in the model from this liberalization, we need to be clear about the appropriate
welfare comparison.  We shall compare the economy with the exogenously expanding intermediated sector
to  the  corresponding  economy  without  an  intermediated  sector  at  the  same  parameter  values.  The
criterion  will be end-of-period  wealth  - that  is what  households  in  the  model  seek to  maximize.  For
a  given  period,  then,  we  shall  characterize  a  household  by  its  wealth  b and  beginning-of-period  cost
* and  ask  how  much  end-of-period  wealth  would  increase  (or  decrease)  if that household  were  in  the
intermediated sector  in the liberalized economy,  as compared
3 5 with the same  household in the economy
without  intermediation,  a restricted economy.
If in fact the wage is the same in the liberalized  and restricted economies, then this is also the obvious,
traditional partial equilibrium experiment - a simple comparison  of matched pairs,  each person with the
same (b, x) combination but residing  in two  different sectors of a given economy, one receiving  treatment
in the intermediated sector  and one without  it.  The wage is the same with  and without intermediation
in both SES and Townsend-Thai  simulations  before  1990, when the subsistence  sector is not depleted.
If the wage  is different  across  the  two  economies,  this latter  comparison  does  not  measure  the  net
welfare impact of the liberalization.  Rather it measures end-of-period  welfare differences  across sectors of
a given  economy that has experienced price  changes.  To be more specific,  those in the non-intermediated
sector of the liberalized  economy  will  experience  the impact  of the liberalization  through  wage changes
- workers  in  the  non-intermediated  sector  may  benefit  from  wage  increases  while  entrepreneurs  in  the
non-intermediated  sector suffer  losses,  since  they face  a  higher  wage.  And  of course there  is  a similar
price impact  for  those in  the intermediated  sector,  but there  is  a credit  effect there  as  well.  There are
such wage effects  using the parameters estimated from both datasets after  1990.
'This  dichotomous  feature of the model could  be improved  by imposing  diminishing returns  in the subsistence  sector.
35We  could  compare  the end-of-period  wealth  of a given  household  with  (b, x)  in the  non-intermediated  sector  of the
intermediated  economy  with  the same  (b,x)  household  in the  non-intermediated  economy  This  would  decompose  the
welfare gains (and  losses).
19Implicit  in this discussion  is  another problem  which  has no  obvious remedy  here,  given the model.
Although households in the model  maximize end-of-period  wealth, they pass on a fraction of that wealth
to their  heirs.  Thus the end-of-period  wealth  effects  of the liberalization  are  passed onto  subsequent
generations.  The problem  is  that there  is no  obvious summary  device  - households  do not  maximize
discounted  expected  utility,  as  in  Greenwood  and  Jovanovic  (1990)  and the  analysis of Townsend  and
Ueda  (2001),  for example.  Here  then we do not attempt to circumvent  the problem but rather present
the more static welfare analysis for various separate periods.  A related issue is the difficulty of weighting
welfare  changes by the endogenous and evolving distributions of wealth in the two economies -see  below
for  more specifics  on that.
We  take  a look first  at the  liberalized  economy  in  1979,  three years  after the  1976  initial start  up,
using  the overall  best fit Townsend-Thai  data  economy  with liberalization.  As noted  earlier,  the wage
has not yet increased as a result of the liberalization.  Its value is  .0198 in the liberalized and restricted
benchmark  economies.  The  interest rate in  the intermediated  sector  of the liberalized  economy  is very
high,  at 93 percent.  This  reflects  the high  marginal  product  of capital  in an economy  with a relatively
low distribution of wealth.
Figure  7b  in  page 44  displays  the  corresponding  occupation  partition,  but now denoting  for  given
beginning-of-period  (b, x)  combinations  the corresponding  occupation  of a household  in  the  no-credit
economy  and in the credit  sector of the intermediated  economy.  The darker shades of Figure  7b denote
households with (b, x) combinations  who do not change their occupation as a result of the liberalization,
that  is,  they  are entrepreneurs  (E)  in the  no-credit  (NC)  economy  and in the  intermediated  sector  of
the liberalized  (C) economy, or workers  (W)  in both  instances.  The light  shades denote  households who
switch:  low wealth but  low cost agents who were  workers  become  entrepreneurs,  and high wealth,  high
cost agents who were entrepreneurs become workers.  The picture is the overlap of the occupational maps
in both sectors.  For the credit  sector, the key parameter  is z, whereas  for the no-credit  sector, it is the
curve xe(b, wo).
Figure 7a in page 44 displays the corresponding  end-of-period wealth percentage  changes  in the same
(b, x)  space.  Since  the  wage  is  the  same  in  both sectors,  agents  will  only  benefit  from  being  in the
credit  sector,  not  only because  they can  freely borrow  at the prevailing  rate if they  decide to become
entrepreneurs,  but because they can deposit their wealth and earn interest on it.  The wealth  gain due to
interest rate earnings can be best seen  by fixing x  and moving along  the b axis,  noting the rise.
If on the other hand we look at the highest wealth,  b = 0.5 edge, we can track the wealth changes that
correspond to changing set  up costs x.  Going  from the rear  of the diagram,  at high  z,  we see that the
wealth increment is constant, but these households were workers in both economies,  so set up costs x are
never  incurred.  Then the wealth increment  drops -these households  were  entrepreneurs  in the no-credit
economy  and were investing some of their wealth in the set up costs x- those with high x gain the most,
quitting that investment and becoming  workers  in the intermediated  sector.  Thus the percentage  wealth
increment drops  as x  decreases.  One  reaches  a trough,  however, when the household  decides  to remain
an  entrepreneur.  Yet  lower set up costs benefit entrepreneurs  in  the intermediated  sector  more than in
the corresponding  no-credit  economy, because the  residual  funds can be  invested at interest.  Hence, the
back edge rises up as x decreases further.
The  most  dramatic  welfare  gains,  however,  are  experienced  by those agents  who are  compelled  to
be  workers  in the no-credit  economy but become  entrepreneurs  in the intermediated  sector.  Although
their setup cost  was relatively low, their wealth was not enough to finance  it.  They were constrained  on
20the extensive  margin.  When  credit barriers  are removed,  they benefit the most.  The sharp vertical  rise
corresponds  to those  on the  margin  of becoming  a entrepreneur  in the  no-credit  economy.  Intuitively,
this  is  because  with their  low  x,  they  would  have  earned  the highest  profits  if they could  have  been
entrepreneurs.  Credit in the intermediated  sector allows  that.
A problem  with this analysis,  however, is that we may be computing welfare gains for household with
(b, x) combinations that do not actually exist in either the liberalized  economy or the no-credit economy,
that is,  have  zero  probability  under the endogenous  distribution  of wealth.  To remedy  this, Figures  7c
and  7d  also  in page  44  display the  wealth  distributions  of the  no-credit  economy  and  credit  economy
(over both sectors)  in  1979.
Figures  7f and 7h present a similar  version, plotting  the joint  density level  curves of the end-of-period
wealth levels  in  the no credit  and liberalized  sector
36. Those  on the  45 degree line  correspond to those
with  no change  in wealth.  We use the  endogenous  end-of-period  wealth  distribution  in  both the  credit
and  no-credit  sector  and the distribution  of x  at the  estimated tilt  parameter  m to  weight  each  (b, x)
pair.
We report  last the density  of percentage  changes  in wealth in Figures  7e and  7g also in page 44 by
integrating  the 3D graph  in Figure 7a over the estimated range of x and weighting each b point using both
the credit and no-credit wealth distribution
3 7. We recognize that the distribution of wealth is endogenous,
so taking any weighting is somewhat  arbitrary.  Still,  when compared,  they display  a somewhat  different
pattern.  We can  convert this relative  wealth  gain into  1997 baht  for both weighting  distributions.  The
mean gain amounts  to 61,582 baht  using the no-credit  distribution or 82,376  baht using the credit  one.
These numbers  correspond  to roughly  1.5 times  and twice  the average  household yearly  1979  income
38
(measured  in  1997 baht)  respectively.  The modal  gains are significantly  lower,  6,961 baht  or 7,779 baht
if we  use  the no-credit  or  credit  distribution,  respectively,  which  amount  to roughly  17 percent  or  19
percent  of the 1979  average household  yearly income.  In dollars,  these gains become  $278 or $311  using
the no-credit  or credit distribution  at the 1997  exchange  rates.
By 1996,  the  wage has risen  to 0.022  in  the non-intermediated  economy  and  to 0.029 in the inter-
mediated  one.  The interest  rate  in the intermediated  sector  has fallen  to  57 percent.  The occupation
partition  diagram  has no  agents  who were  entrepreneurs  becoming  workers  (though that number  was
never  large).  In contrast,  the relative  number of those who were  workers  and  become entrepreneurs  is
higher.  The  three dimensional  diagramn  in Figure  8a in page  45  of wealth changes  is still tilted  upward
towards  high  wealth,  due  to  the interest  rate  effect.  On the back  edge,  at  the highest wealth  shown,
wealth increments are positive and constant for those who stay as workers, both due to higher wages and
interest  rate  earnings,  but  those who  were  workers and  become  entrepreneurs  have  high  wealth gains,
which  increases  as x falls,  since net profits of entrepreneurs  increases as setup costs  falls and funds can
be put into the money market.  However,  one reaches a point where they  would have been entrepreneurs
in  both  economies,  incurring  x  in both  economies,  and  then the  wealth  gains  though  increasing  as x
decreases are relatively small or negative.  Note that on the one hand, entrepreneurs  in the intermediated
sector face  higher wages,  obtaining  lower profits.  On the other, they  are able to collect  interest on their
38The joint density is approximated  using kernel density estimation,  from a generated sample of 10,000 points  The kerrnel
used is Epanechnikov.  See  Silverman  (1986)  for details.  Some  level  curves  fall below  the 45°li  ne,  but this is an artifact
of the kernel  density estimation  which tends to oversmooth.  Figure 7a assures us that the liberalization  only improves the
welfare.  Each  contour  level represents  an increased  density of 0.01, starting  at 0.0025
37The density  is approximated  by the techniques  explained in Footnote  36
3The 1979  average household yearly  income  is estimated  from  the SES data.  Since we  do not have actual SES data m
1979,  we interpolate  it using the average  annual growth rate between  1976 and  1981
21wealth.  These  opposing wealth  effects will translate  into net gains or losses depending  on their relative
magnitude.  More  salient,  the  former  tent-shaped  region  has pervaded this  graph - the biggest  gainers
throughout the entire distribution of wealth are those on the margin of indifference between staying  as a
worker  or becoming an entrepreneur  in the non-intermediated  economy.
The distributions of wealth  of the no-credit  and intermediated  sector are  also plotted  in  Figures  8c
and  8d  in  page 45.  Note  that the scale  has changed.  Evidently  both  are more compressed  from  what
they had been in 1979.  Applying those distributions as weights to the diagrams with level wealth changes
around  the 45  degree  line,  one  sees that  again  those  at the  low  end  of wealth would  be  measured  as
having  extraordinary  gains,  from  zero to  ten-fold  or more,  and  again  in  the  credit  economy  a  richer
class  gains somewhat  from the  yet  high  interest  rates.  The  mean  welfare  gains  of those  who  benefit
from  the  liberalization  amount  to  52,573  baht  or 65,789  1997 baht  if we  use  the No-Credit  or Credit
distribution,  respectively.  The modal gains are lower at 6,863 baht or  15,905 baht  using the No-Credit
and Credit  distribution.  They  correspond to roughly  9 percent and 21 percent,  respectively,  of the  1996
yearly household  income  as reported in the SES data.  If we translate  these modal  gains into dollars,  we
obtain  $275  or $636 per  year.  However,  there is also a  nontrivial  fraction  of entrepreneurs  who end up
losing  due to higher wages.  The mean losses for this subset of the population  amount to 9,509 baht using
the  No-Credit distribution  or 34,816 baht  using the  Credit distribution.  They correspond  to roughly 9
percent and  32 percent  of the 1996  average household  yearly income  for the sample of entrepreneurs.  In
dollars,  these losses become $380 and $1,393  using the  No Credit  and Credit distribution,  respectively.
We now turn to the welfare comparison from the simulation using the best fit estimated MLE param-
eters  using the SES data.  The first thing to notice  is that reported  welfare  gains are much  lower.  Two
years  after the outset of the liberalization,  1978,  both economies have the same wage,  and therefore  the
credit liberalization only improves the welfare  of those who can take advantage  of it.  The 3D Figure 9a in
page 46 resembles somewhat  that of 1979 using the parameters  estimated  from the Townsend-Thai  data.
It  is titled upward  as we move along  the b axis due to interest  earning gains and again,  the big winners
are those who could not afford  the set up cost (even though it was low)  and had to take a job as a worker.
If credit were available  to them,  they would become  entrepreneurs,  realizing  huge profits,  amounting to
an increase in their wealth by a factor of up to nine-fold.  The kernel  density estimates  in Figure 9e and
9g in  page 46,  however,  show that the average wealth  increase  is somewhat  lower,  around  100 percent.
These correspond to a mean wealth gain of 102,586  baht or 90,785 baht if we  use the  no-credit  or credit
distribution,  respectively.  The modal gains are again much  lower,  5,560  baht for the no-credit  or  17,000
baht for the credit  distribution.  These correspond to $222 or $680 at the 1997 exchange rate or, roughly
14 percent  or 41  percent  of the average household yearly income  in 1978.
In  1996, the 3D Figure  lOa in page  47 shows  that welfare gains are somewhat  smaller.  Those agents
that remain  workers in  the credit sector  are better off because  they  earn a higher  wage,  and those that
become  entrepreneurs  in  both sectors  end  up losing  because  they  face  higher labor  costs.  As  in  the
Townsend-Thai  dataset,  if we look at the distribution of welfare gains in Figures  10e  and 10e,  page  47,
there is a significant  fraction of agents who end up losing about half of their annual wealth.  The average
wealth gain is still positive  at around  100 percent  if we use the no-credit wealth  distribution and around
80 percent  if we use the credit one.  But both distributions have negative support, a result of the fact that
agents benefit in diverse ways from the credit liberalization.  The mean welfare gains for those who benefit
from the liberalization are 83,444  1997 baht or 76,840 1997 baht for the no-credit  and credit distribution,
respectively,  and correspond  to 1.09 times or one  time the  1996  average  household yearly  income.  The
22modal welfare  gains of those who gain  are roughly  18,591  baht or 25,655 under the no-credit  and credit
distributions which  correspond to roughly  24  percent  and 34 percent  of 1996  average  household  yearly
income, equivalent  to $1,030  at the 1997  exchange  rate.  The mean losses,  for those worse  off are 115,861
baht or 117,051  using the no-credit and credit distributions respectively,  which amounts to 1.06 times or
1.08 times the average  household yearly  income for the sample of entrepreneurs,  or roughly $4,650 using
again  the 1997 exchange  rate.
10  Extensions:  International  Capital  Inflows  and  Alternative
Credit Regimes
In this section,  we explore  two important  extensions  to the  model.  These may  be viewed  as robustness
checks  to the results presented in the previous sections.  The first concerns  the liberalization  of the capital
account that Thailand experienced,  especially after  1988.  The second relaxes the assumption of restricted
credit to allow  for some external  financing.  We now take each one in turn.
Figure 11  in page 48 displays the capital  inflows  as a fraction  of GDP. The data come from the Bank
of Thailand as  reported  in  Alba,  Hernandez  and  Klingbiel  (1999).  From  1976 to  1986,  private  capital
inflows to Thailand remained relatively  low at an average of 1.05%  of GDP. From 1986  to 1988, however,
they increased rapidly  to 10% of GDP,  remaining  at that average  level  until  1996.
This enhanced  capital  availability  was  funnelled through the  financial sector  and thus it is modelled
here as additional  capital  for  those households  that have  access to the financial  market  (i.e.  residing in
the  credit  sector).  We  run  this extended  (open)  version of the  model at the  estimated  and  calibrated
parameters  and  compare  it  to  the  previous  closed  credit  economy  model  at  the  same  estimated  and
calibrated  parameter  values from the two datasets
39. Although  not shown,  capital  inflows contribute  to
a larger number of entrepreneurs,  and larger firm size,  in particular in the late 80's and early  90's.  Since
the marginal  product  of labor increases  with capital  utilization,  more  labor  is demanded  and thus the
fraction of subsisters is depleted earlier.  Thus labor share rises  and inequality decreases, both relative to
the actual path and  relative to the earlier  simulation.  The interest  rate  tends to be  lower  with  capital
inflows.  Nevertheless,  the welfare changes  are small, indeed,  almost  negligible.
Because the surge in capital inflows coincides with the phase of high growth of per capita GDP, it has
often been  portrayed  as an  important  factor contributing  to that high  growth.  In  order to disentangle
the extent to  which the phase  of high growth  was due  to increased  participation  in the credit  market
versus additional capital availability due to capital account liberalization,  we simulate the economy at the
estimated and calibrated parameter  values allowing for international capital inflows but using a linearized
credit participation  from 6% to 26%, that is, a one percent increase  per year for each of the 20 years.  As
displayed  in  Figure  12,  page  48,  this  version  of the model  fails  to match the upturn  in GDP growth  as
compared  to the benchmark  credit economy.  Thus,  it seems  from the model that capital  inflows per  se
were not  the cause of the high  growth that Thailand experienced  in the late 80's.
The  assumption  of restricted  credit may  artificially  deliver  quantitatively  large  welfare  gains  from
liberalization  if those  assumed  to have  no  access  were  in fact  able  to receive  some credit,  perhaps  from
391n  addition,  we  re-calibrated the cost  of living  v, subsistence  level  growth  rate 7gr  and the bequest  motive  parameter
w for this  open  economy  version  and  found  even  fewer  differences  compared to  the  closed  economy  model.  In particular,
the calibrated bequest  motive parameter w is lower for both datasets in the open economy version,  so that the depletion of
subsisters  happens at a slower rate.
23informal sources.  Indeed, in the model so far, we have not allowed any form of lending (formal or informal)
for those households  residing in the no-credit  sector.  We now relax that assumption and explore whether
the welfare gains from liberalization  would differ significantly  from those reported in the previous section.
We follow Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt  (2000) and introduce intermediation  which  is limited by a moral
hazard  problem4 0. In particular,  given  an  interest rate  of r,  possibly  different  from that  in the  formal
sector, entrepreneurs borrow L and put up their wealth b as collateral.  After production they can abscond
losing rb but escaping the repayment obligation rL.  Absconders are apprehended with probability p and
if so they  can hide their income  but receive  a punishment  corresponding  to  an additive  disutility of d.
Borrowers  will  renege  on  the  loan  contract  if rb + pd < rL,  so  lenders  only  make  loans  that  satisfy
L  < b + A,  where  A  = pd/r.  Thinking  again about  help  from friends  and relatives,  we set  r  = 1 so
that the objective  function  for  households  that now can  "borrow"  from the informal sector  is the same
as before.  However,  the constraint  in (3)  is now modified  to
k+z <b+A.
In effect,  parameter  A is  treated as a lump sum addition to wealth but only  for those  who  borrow from
the informal  sector  and choose  to  start firms  This would  allow  more  talented  households  to alleviate
credit constraints41.
As shown in the  Appendix,  parameter A  would  be identified  in cross  sectional maximum  likelihood
estimation.  However,  to give parameter A a greater  opportunity to influence the dynamic paths relative
to the  earlier  simulation,  we  calibrate  the parameter  A  against  the  dynamic  aggregate  data  for each
dataset  using the previously  estimated  and calibrated  parameter  values for  the other parameters.  The
calibrated values of parameter  A  are A = 0.0163  for the Townsend-Thai  dataset  and  A = 0.0082  for the
SES dataset.  These correspond  to 1.1 times and 30% of the subsistence  income  in 1976  for  each dataset
respectively.
Similarly to the open economy version,  the increased  informal  finance speeds  up the creation of firms
resulting in  an earlier  depletion of the fraction of subsisters.  Again, labor share begins to increase  along
with a decline  in the Gini coefficient,  both at an earlier date.
Although the parameter  A could in principle have a large welfare  impact, at the calibrated  parameter
A that best fits the Thai economy,  these welfare  gains  and losses  remain much  as before.  In particular,
the counterparts  of Figures  7a  - lOa in pages  44-47  still  feature the tent-shaped  gains  for relatively
talented but poor people.  Recall that in the intermediated sector, only the most talented  individuals will
start  a firm, irrespective  of their wealth.  However,  even when  we relax  the constraint  in the no-credit
sector  by  alowing informal  finance,  wealth  still matters  in  determining who  becomes  an entrepreneur,
and thus the tent-shaped  welfare gains still appear.  In addition, the increased  wage  in the latter periods
does  benefit workers in the liberalized economy.  In the no-credit  economy which now has informal credit,
some households  become richer  but the additional  capital  from informal sources is insufficient  to trigger
an  increase in the equilibrium  wage  rate.  Thus, in the welfare experiment  comparing  the intermediated
to the no-formal-credit  economies,  wage  earners  benefit more  from the  liberalization,  but not much.  In
contrast,  firms lose from the  relative increase in the  wage, but not much.
4
0We  also tried  modifying the constraint  in  (3)  to k  E  i4O, b - xz,  where the parameter  N.  measures  the severity  of the
financing  constraints.  Thus, if some of the assets that  make up wealth are  illiquid,  we would expect  rN  <  1.  Unfortunately,
this specrfication  is not  useful because the parameter  N cannot  be identified.
4t We are  implicitly assuming a partial equilibrium,  unlimited supply of funds by setting  r =  1.  However,  the magnitude
of the calibrated  parameter  A  as reported  below is  comparable to the average  amount of informal  borrowing found  in  the
Townsend-Thai  dataset  by those households  who borrow  informally.
24A prediction  of the  model that  could seemingly  be checked  in the data  concerns  rates of return to
capital.  One might suppose  that with limited credit  the rate of return to capital  would  be high.  This is
true for some firms  in the simulations.  However,  for other firms without access to intermediation, wealth
cannot  be lent at interest  and is thus invested internally at low rates of return.  Thus the implication  of
the model is unclear about the mean, average rate of return to capital  and only asserts that the dispersion
of rates of return is higher for  firms  without access  relative  to those who  can borrow and lend.
11  Conclusions
From the welfare numbers presented, there seems to be a lot at stake in credit liberalizations.  Even by our
most conservative  estimates there  is a group  of low wealth  talented  households  who have much  to gain,
period by period, in income and wealth.  On the other hand, the estimates reveal a group of entrepreneurs
who have  much  to lose,  period  by period,  in income  and wealth,  particularly  if one takes  into account
the growth  in wages.  We do not push here any  particular any number as the most compelling,  because
the numbers  do vary  and do depend  on the dataset  used.  Indeed,  the larger  point is that welfare  gains
and losses  are sensitive to the presumed,  estimated  micro underpinnings  of the economy.  If there were
more substantial intermediation,  then variations associated with further liberalization  would matter less
Indeed,  if there were  more  substantial  intermediation,  then  the impact  on dynamics  of (endogenous)
changes  in the wealth distribution  would matter  less, as in Krusell  and Smith (1998).  But the micro data
reject such  presumed underpinnings,  making welfare  gains, potential  losses,  and the dynamic aspect of
liberalization  more substantial.
Still, the surprisingly large order of magnitude of these gains and losses suggests the need for further
refinements  along  a number  of  dimensions,  to see  if the  magnitude  survives  somewhat  more  realistic
specifications.
One  refinement  has to do  with labor  and the labor market.  The labor of the model  here  is uniform
with  respect to productivity,  that is,  every laborer  earns the same wage.  This ffies  in the face  of much
empirical work mapping wage  differentials  to skills  differentials  and acquired  human capital.  More  gen-
erally,  earnings inequality  contributes to overall  inequality,  and this might be salient, as in the work of
Ricardo  Paes  de Barros  in  Brazil,  for  example.  Jeong  and Townsend  (2000)  document the success  and
failure of the LEB model in explaining inequality  movements in Thailand,  comparing it to an extended
version of Greenwood  and Jovanovic (1990).  Though the LEB model at the maximum likelihood parame-
ter estimates  does surprisingly well, it is clear that wage  differentiation is needed in models and in model
based empirical  work.  In the model of occupation  choice  of Evans  and Jovanovic  (1989),  for  example,
unobserved heterogeneous skills influence both wage earnings and the profits from entrepreneurship.  This
might  suggest  that entrepreneurs  worry  less  about increased  wages  as they  potentially  exit  to become
part of a skilled work force.
Second,  one could  endogenize  access to credit as in the Greenwood  and Jovanovic  (1990)  model with
transactions  costs.  This would  slow  down the growth of financial  infrastructure  and would rationalize
some of the limited participation  that we see but there would be no Pareto-improving  policy intervention.
However,  Townsend and Ueda (2001)  in an extended version of the Greenwood and Jovanovic model draw
the conclusion that restrictive financial  sector  policies may have nevertheless  slowed  down entry into the
financial sector  below the endogenous  rate.  Thus  financial  sector liberalization,  allowing intermediation
at  its  otherwise  endogenous  value,  is  also  associated  with welfare  gains,  as  in  this paper  Although
25occupation  choice  models  should  allow  more  endogenous  financial  sector  participation,  they illustrate
well  as they stand the fact that there may  be welfare losses  for  some sectors of the  population,  not just
gains, to liberalization.  This offers a political economy rational for the apparently  restrictive policies  that
we observed  in Thailand.
Third,  the imagined  industrial  organization of the Thai economy  is relatively  simple.  In  the model
here  fixed setup costs  are allowed  to vary across  potential entrepreneurs,  as  if drawn  from a quadratic
cumulative  distribution, but the quadratic production  function mapping labor and capital into output  is
uniform across potential entrepreneurs.  This delivers the occupation partition diagram  and variation over
time in the size distribution of firms,  a function  of the wage  and the endogenous distribution  of wealth.
Indeed,  an  industrial  organization  literature  starting with  Lucas  (1978)  begins  the  same  way,  at  least
in spirit.  He postulates  an underlying  distribution  of personal  managerial  talent  and then  studies  the
division of persons into managers and employees and the allocation of productive  inputs across  managers.
This has implications  for secular changes in average firm size.  This point is revisited by  Gollin  (1999).
Here  the distribution of size and  profits among firms  is driven  by self-financing,  an endogenous  and
evolving  distribution of wealth,  and differential  access  to credit.  That  is,  high set up costs and  limited
credit  can limit  the use of real  physical  capital  in  the standard  part of the production  function  or can
impede  entry entirely.  Likewise,  some  portion of end-of period profits  is  passed  on to subsequent time
periods if not subsequent  generations.  This could be an explanation  for some  of the serial correlation  in
size,  profits,  and employment  that is seen in actual  data,  even  when shocks  in  the form of set  up costs
are independent  and  identically  distributed  over  time and  households  There  would  be implications  for
the cross-sectional  dispersion  in  growth rates.  Indeed,  it seems  that in Thailand  larger  firms,  and those
with financial  access,  may  have  grown  faster  than smaller  ones  as  the credit  market  expanded  in the
late  1980's.  Recent  theoretical  work is  beginning  to readdress earlier  the  supposed  facts  of firm  growth
and survival  in the context  of endogenous  limited  financial  contracts.  See Albuquerque  and Hopenhayn
(2001)  and Cooley,  Marimon  and Quadrini  (2000)
More  generally  both  the  industrial  organization  and  credit  market  literature  need  to  be  brought
together.  Existing empirical  work  has documented  relationships  between  investment  and  the balance
sheet,  for  example,  but much  of this work  is somewhat  atheoretic,  documenting  that the world  is not
neoclassical  but leaving  us wondering what the impediments to trade really are.  The general equilibrium
models  of Banerjee  and  Newman  (1993),  Piketty  (1997)  and Aghion  and  Bolton  (1997)  take  different
stands  on those underpinnings  but collectively make the point that growth and inequality can be related
to imperfect  credit markets.  That of course  was our starting point here.
Indeed,  in  related  work Paulson  and Townsend  (2001)  use the  Townsend-Thai  data to estimate  via
maximum  likelihood  methods  not only the LEB  model featured  here,  but  also collateral  based  lending
as in model  of Evans and Jovanovic  (1989)  (EJ for short),  for example,  and also incentive-based  lending
as in the mechanism design literature of Aghion  and Bolton  (1997) and Lehnert  (1998)  (ABL for short).
Observed  relationships of entrepreneurship,  investment,  and access  to credit  as functions  of wealth  and
talent suggest that the  ABL model  fits the micro Thai data best,  but the EJ  model fits well  for those
with relatively  low  levels  of wealth and  those  in  the Northeast,  while  LEB,  the model  here,  is a close
contender.  This suggests  that  a calculation of the welfare gains  and losses  to financial intermediation
based on these other  models would  be worthwhile,  though  the average and modal estimates  here should
not be  rejected  out of hand.  It does seem  plausible,  however,  that the dramatic gains  near the wealth
equal set-up  costs or 45°  line would  be vulnerable  to alternative  specifications.
26The growth and  inequality literature  relying on each of these underpinnings  presupposes,  as  in the
LEB model  here, either an overlapping  generations  model with a bequest motive or a simplistic,  myopic
solution to the household savings problem.  More needs to be done to make the models dynamic.  Coupling
households with firms  and modelling the firms'  inter-temporal  decision  problems will  require more work,
but again, given  the prelinminary  results  here, that work would  appear to be warranted.
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A  Data
Table  2:  Thai  Data
Year  GDP Growth  Savings Rate  Labor Share  Frac. of Entr.  Income Gini  Fin. Lib.
1976  7.656  0.219  0.402  0.140  0.418  0.060
1977  8.048  0.219  0.402  0.143  0.412  0.078
1978  9.255  0.219  0.382  0.146  0.413  0.089
1979  4.944  0.219  0.380  0.148  0.420  0.096
1980  5.911  0.222  0.388  0.149  0.430  0.099
1981  6.309  0.210  0.395  0.150  0.443  0.100
1982  5.149  0.224  0.401  0.150  0.457  0.100
1983  4.328  0.220  0.407  0.151  0.469  0.100
1984  4.662  0.225  0.405  0.150  0.480  0.100
1985  4.607  0.231  0.401  0.150  0.487  0.101
1986  5.737  0.244  0.385  0.150  0.489  0.105
1987  8.262  0.275  0.373  0.150  0.486  0.124
1988  10.008  0.320  0.365  0.150  0.486  0.150
1989  8.231  0.341  0.351  0.150  0.496  0.172
1990  9.580  0.330  0.357  0.150  0.512  0.190
1991  9.078  0.347  0.362  0.148  0.527  0.206
1992  9.237  0.338  0.393  0.150  0.535  0.220
1993  8.237  0.341  0.404  0.158  0.532  0.231
1994  7.515  0.348  0.425  0.170  0.521  0.240
1995  7.181  0.349  0.447  0.179  0.509  0.249
1996  4.850  0.332  0.458  0.180  0.503  0.260
Data on the growth rate of GDP is taken from  the computations  of Tinakorn and Sussangkarn  (1998)
of the TDRI  (Thailand Development  Research Institute).  They use data from the the NESDB (National
Economic  Social Development  Board)  in  Thailand.  Data  for the missing  years  1976-1980  were taken
directly  from  the NESDB  "Gross  Regional  Product  and  Gross  Provincial  Product"  national  income
accounts and  for  1996  as reported  by the Bank of Thailand.  The  real GDP growth  series in  Table 2
is constructed  by  subtracting  a  3-year  moving  average  of the reported  TFP  growth  in  Tinakorn  and
Sussangkarn  (1998)  from the observed  GDP  growth rate.  TFP growth was  extrapolated  for the missing
years.  We subtract  TFP growth because we are only interested  in growth due to factor accumulation,  as
the model  allows no technological  progress42. The data on labor share  come also from the calculations
of  Tinakorn  and  Sussangkarn  (1998).  The  savings  rate  can  also  be estimated  from  national  income
accounts.  Here we use the numbers  provided by the Bank of Thailand  from  1980-1996 and extrapolated
420ur version  of the  LEB  model  allows  exogenous  technological  progress  in the  subsistence  sector  yg,  but  when we
calibrate the intermediated  economy in Section 6  in the text, the parameter -g,  is virtually  zero.
28the  missing  years.  Data on the  number  of entrepreneurs  as  a fraction  of the  Thai  population  come
from  successive  rounds  of the  national  level  income  and  expenditures  socio-economic  survey,  the  SES
mentioned  earlier,  administered  by  the National  Statistics  Office.  Here  we  use the  occupation  of the
head of the household unit.  There  are four broad categories for occupation:  wage worker,  farmer, non-
farm  entrepreneur,  and  inactive.  We define  entrepreneur  as  the head  of household  listed as  non-farm
entrepreneur.  We approximate  the missing years using cubic spline interpolation.  The same SES surveys
were  used to compute the  widely used  Gini  index as a measure  of inequality.  Finally we again  use the
SES  data and  the calculations  of Jeong  (1999)  to determine  the fraction  of the population which  has
access  to intermediated,  credit and savings markets,  i.e.,  that reside  in the  credit sector
43.
B  ML Estimation
In this  appendix  we  first derive the  parameters  that are  estimated  and then  show how  we recover  the
five technology  parameters  from the maximum  likelihood  estimates.  We then explain  in full detail  the
constraints  on the parameter space  imposed by the theory.
B.1  Deriving the estimated  parameters
The occupation  indifference  point  xe(b, w)  given  in Equation  11  in the  main text  can be written as,
F u  1  k  CF2 _\3  (  -W)
2
-k-x
w  = k  [a +-  (-w)j  +  2-  (--  x)  +  2  (B1)
Define the following constants
K, =  ap  -,  K2  =  +-a(C-w),  and  K3 =  (1-w).  (B2)
p  p  p
We can then write equation  (B1)  as
w = (2)K  + (b-z)K2 + K3-b  (B3)
where we made explicit  again that kc  = b -.
Solving the above quadratic equation  for x and taking the root  which  ensures
44 that  dk > 0 in (Bi),
we obtain
K(  -+X  =fK~-i  Ks-2(v+b)l  B4
x'(b, w) = b + K2  - K  --- --  7  (B4)
The  constants which  can  be estimated  are K1, K2(w),  and K3(w)  defined  earlier in equation  (B2)
where  now the dependence  on the wage  w  is made explicit  in the notation.  It can be shown with some
tedious  algebra  that numbers  like ku(w),  b(w)  and  b'(w)  in  Figure  1 are entirely  determined  by  these
constants  In addition, with a non-linear transformation  into constants
43The  SES  survey  records  whether  any  member  of the  household  transacted  during  the  previous  month  with  any of
the  formal  financial  institutions,  such  as  commnercial  banks,  savings  banks,  BAAC,  government  housing  banks,  financial
companies or credit financiers.  A household is categorized  as having access to credit if it transacted with any formal financial
institution.
"The  intuition  for choosing the positive  root is that if the setup cost  x is larger,  more capital k  is required  for the agent
to be indifferent  between both occupations
29Cl(  = K 2 (w)  =  2wK3()  and  C3 =--  (B5)
K 1 ~~~~~K 1 K1
we can rewrite  all the key parameters  of the occupation  partition as follows:
(w) = C2(w),  b  (w) = C()+C 2()  _  C3 (W)=C 3 + C 1 (W) 2-+C 2(W)
and finally,  as in equation  (B4),
xe(b, w) = b - C(w) + VCi(w)2 + C2(w) - C3b.  (B7)
In the estimation,  we make use of the constants defined  in  (B5) rather  than those in (B2)  because as
equation  (B7)  shows, the  unknown parameters  enter additively  or with low  power  on exponents  rather
than the more complicated  case of (B4).
As  explained  in  Section  5,  only  three  parameters  are identified  in  a simple  cross-section  and  not
five.  However,  if we exploit  the variation in the wages observed  in the data  we can  fully identify  all the
production parameters.  In particular, if we are able to partition the original sample into two subsamples45
facing  different  underlying  wages  w,,j =  1,2,  then  we obtain  estimates of Cll, C 1 2, C 2 1, C 2 2,  C 3 and
m, where  C,  = C,(w,).  More  specifically,  if we group the  parameters  m,  C 1l,  C 21, C3 for  Subsample  1
and m, C 12, C22,  C3 for  Subsample  2,  with  m and C 3 common  across  subsamples,  then  the likelihood
of the sample  in the two  regions  is  determined.  In other words,  the MLE algorithm  searches  over  the
parameters  C,,, C 3, m and s  in such a way as to make the observed sample  most  likely.  Then,  the five
production  parameters  can be recovered  from the four C,,, C3, and an estimate of the average  wage4"  in
each  subsample converted to LEB  units.  Therefore,  full identification  is achieved.
Finally,  equation  (B7)  can be modified  to allow  for the limited intermediation  introduced  in  Section
10:
xe(b, w,  A) = b + A-C,(w) + VCI(w)2 + C2(w)-C 3b,
where  2w+A  3W
rC 2(W) =  2(7+A)-Ks(w)  (B8)
It  is clear  from the expression  above  that A  enters  as  a separate parameter  and would  be identified
in cross sectional  maximum likelihood  estimation.
B.2  Recovering  the technology  parameters
Given the estimates of Cll, C 1 2, C 21, C 22 and C 3 we first recover the constants K1 and K2 1, K22, K31, K 32
where  K,, = K,(w,)  as before.  From the definition  of the C's given in  (B5), we can write
K,  = -C  XK()  =  C(  )  and  K3(w)  =  2 (  + C  )).  (B9) ~~3  ~  C3 W  C  ) 
451n  principle and depending  on the data,  we could use more than two subsamples,  thus obtaining different  estimates  for
the production parameters.  We could  then use Mmimum  Classical Distance  methods to obtain the estimates for  the whole
sample.
46We  take the wage to  be the labor income  for those  individuals who reported  having  no business.
30We  now use  the definition  of the K's  given  in equation  (B2)  to  recover the five  production parameters.
We first find C by dividing K31 by K32. After some  algebra we obtain
w2Y31-  wv32
Using  the definition  of either K31 or K32, using the  expression  for  C derived  above  we obtain  a similar
expression for p:
P=( W2  - WI  Bl '=  ~~~~~~~~~~~~(Bil)
Now subtracting  K 22 from K21 and using the expression  for  p we  can solve  for the parameter  e  yielding
e  (W2  - W)(K 21 - K 2 2)  (B12)
We obtain  a  by  using  the  expressions  for  e  and p just  derived  and  either  combination  of K2,,w,  or
K22, W 2 into its definition.  After some algebra,  we obtain
K22  - K2  (B13)
Finally, we recover  3 from its definition  using the expressions  from a2 and p.  This yields,
K 2 1 - K 2 2 2
I  -~~~~~K 1 . (B314)
B.3  Constraints  on the parameter  space
The nature of the constraints that the model suggests  should be imposed  on the parameter  space  guided
the  choice  of  the MATLAB  maximization  routine  fmincon.  It  allows  for  bounds,  and  for  linear  and
nonlinear  constraints.  In  what  foUows,  we  explain  each  in  turn.  The  parameters  that  the  algorithm
searches  over  are m,  Cil,  C 12,  C 21,  C 22,  C 3 and  s.  First,  the specification  of the talent  distribution
restricts  the  support of m  E  [-1,11.  In  addition,  the expression  for  profits  given  in  (8),  written  as a
quadratic  expression  in  k, is well-behaved  as long  as the constant  K2 defined  in  (B2)  is  negative.  This
implies  that C3 needs to be positive.  Finally, the scaling factor  s must be positive.
In addition  to these bounds on the parameters,  the critical  value of b must satisfy:
0 < b(w,)  < 1,  for i =  1, 2.  (B15)
If the cutoff  value  b is  larger than  one, then  the parameters  governing  the cutoff level  x'  given  in  (B7)
will not be identified.  However,  since the probability  of being a worker  and having wealth  in LEB  units
b > 1 is  zero,  the log-likelihood  of this zero probability  event  is minus infinity  and so we do not  need to
impose the restriction.
In addition, since the cutoff  level  z' is increasing  in b and concave,  it must  be the case  that
b(w,)  <  x*(w.),  and  (B16)
x*(wt,)  <  b*(w,),  for i =1,2.  (1317)
It turns out that both  expressions  are satisfied  if k,'  > 0  for t =  1, 2 or  in terms of the estimates,  if we
impose the linear constraints
C 2>  231  for  i =  1,2.  (B18)
31Finally,  Footnote  9  imposes additional  constraints  on the parameters.  In particular,  (  > w, for i =  1, 2
and  or > 0.  Assume without loss of generality that w2 > wi.  FRom the expression for ( in equation (B10),
> w 2 as long as K31 > K32. Some algebra yields that this is equivalent to
1-  b 2 >  W2  - Wl
or in terms of the estimated  parameters,
C21 > C22 + C3(w2-w).  (B19)
Likewise,  from the expression  for a in equation  (B12), a > 0 as long as K2, > K22. We can  rewrite  this
as
k'  > k2'  or simply  C1l > C12. (B20)
However,  in  the  actual  estimation  rather  than  imposing  the constraints  given  in  (B19)  and  (B20)
ex-ante,  we  learned  from  experience  that the numerical  algorithm  performed  better without  imposing
them, then checking and eliminating  the estimates  that did not satisfy them after convergence  had been
achieved.
C  Computational  Appendix
In this appendix we describe how we compute the equilibrium  wage each period using a bisection method,
discretize the support  of the resulting distribution of wealth,  and allow  the upper and lower bounds  of
wealth to evolve.  We are numerically computing non-steady state equilibria to LEB, with diversity across
agents in the setup costs x and with the "transactions  technology"  associated with liquidity constraints.
We first describe  the  equilibrium  computations in  the benchmark  LEB  model and we  then turn to the
intermediated version.
C.1  Equilibrium  in the Benchmark  LEB model
Given that the benchmark  LEB model  is  absent  of any credit  market,  we  only  need  to compute the
equilibrium wage  w.
C.1.1  Determining the Equilibrium Wage
The initial wealth distribution for the current period t is discretized over 201 grid points.  This distribution
is used by a function  that determines the equilibrium wage  wt  at date t.
Consider now a given  wage w  (where we drop the time subscript t).  Given this value of w, the cutoff
setup costs xe(b, w) and xu(b, w)  in Figure 1 in the paper can be determined  for each  value of the support
of the given initial wealth distribution b E B.  This determines the occupational choice for the agents with
wealth b:  the mass of people for  whom the setup cost x satisfies x < x'(b, w) wiU become entrepreneurs.
Given that the total population has mass one,  individual probabilities coincide with the fraction of agents
in the population.  Therefore,  the total number of agents  with wealth  b that  will  become entrepreneurs
is  the  fraction  (probability)  of agents  with  initial  wealth  b  multiplied  by  the probability  of the event
x < X'(b, w).  Aggregating over the entire  support  Bt we obtain the total number of entrepreneurs  E(w)
as a function of the wage w.  More  formally,
32201
E(w) = Z[H(xe(b., w))]N(b,)  (Ci)
*11
where g is the discretized  probability function of the wealth distribution (cdf)  G.
Now  let  Ld(w)  denote the total  labor  demand  by entrepreneurs  at the wage  w.  Notice  that labor
demand consists of two parts:  demand by unconstrained  firms, which solely depends on the wage  w, and
demand  by  constrained  firms which  depends  on both the capital  employed b - x  and the wage w.  More
formally,
201  z(b6,)
Ld(w)  =  E  tI(w)H(xu(b., w)) +  1  1c(b,x,w)dH(z)  g(b,)  (C2)
where g is the discretized  probability function of the wealth distribution  (cdf) G.
Intuitively,  if at the given wage  w, Ld(w) + E(w) is greater than one, then the wage  is too low and
needs to be higher.  That  is, labor  demand  is proportional  to number of entrepreneurs  E, and it is  easy
to show that both E(w) and Ld(w) are monotonically  decreasing in wages.  If E(w) + Ld(w)  is less than
one, the guessed wage is too high and so it should be lower,  except if w = w. Indeed,  if we reach the lower
bound  w, it means  that at this minimum wage,  total labor demand  in the urban sector  (entrepreneurs
and workers)  is less than the total population  and therefore  some agents will become subsisters
More formally, the algorithm uses a bisection  method to determine the wage rate w . The use of this
simple  method is warranted  by the fact that both E(W) and Ld(w)  are monotonically decreasing  in the
wage w and thus a unique equilbrium  exists.  It starts with WL  =  w and some  arbitrary
4 7 upper bound
WH  =  W-  It then  computes  E(WL)  + Ld(WL)  with  the wage at the  lower  bound,  WL  =  w.  This  is the
obvious initial guess.  Then  if E(WL) + Ld(WL)  < 1, labor market clearing  is achieved  If on the contrary
E(WL)  + Ld(WL)  >  1, there is an excess  demand at the prevailing  wage  WL  and the wage needs to be
raised.  From here onwards  the algorithm proceeds  as follows:
1.  Update the wage to w' =  w+WH  and compute  E(w') + Ld(WI).
(a)  If E(W,') + Ld(tI)  <  1, update  the upper bound WH =W' and repeat  to Step  1.
(b)  If E(W') + Ld(W')  > 1, update  the lower  bound  wH  =  w' and repeat Step  1
(c)  If E(w') +  Ld(Wt)  =  1, labor market  equilibrium  is reached.
If no guess appears to ever  clear the market, we have nevertheless  a sequence  of upper  and lower bounds
with the equilibrium  wage trapped in  an interval whose  width  is converging.  So,  if WH - WL  < , where
e  is a convergence  criterion,  then the program sets  W  =  WL.
C.1.2  Computing the bequest  given  the equilibrium wage  w
The support  of the wealth  distribution  for next  period,  B', is again  discretized  over 201  points.  The
endpoints  are computed  as  follows.  The  upper  bound BH  is defined  as the bequest  of the agent  with
the highest  initial wealth  b, assuming  she has the lowest  setup coat x.  Similarly,  the lower bound BL  is
defined  as the  bequest of the agent with the  lowest  initial wealth  b assuming  she  has  the highest setup
cost  x.  We take  BL  and BH as  the two  endpoints  of the support  B'  and  divide  the  interval  into 201
equally spaced grid points.
4 7In our algorithm  we take this upper bound  as 1 7 from  prior experience
33Now  with  the equilibrium  wage  determined,  the occupation  for each agent  and  her  corresponding
income and wealth can be computed.  We thus can find  what her bequest  will be.  We then proceed  by
placing this bequest to the closest  bequest  B' E  B'  grid point.  Next  period bequest  as a function of the
initial wealth  b and occupation  choice  is as follows:
J  w(w-v + b)  if  x > ze(b, w),  (the agent becomes  a subsister  or worker)
B(b, z, w) =  w(7rc(b,x,w)-x-v + b)  if  x'(b,w)  > x > xu(b,w),  (constrained entrepreneur)
w(ru(w) -z- x  v+b)  if  x < xu(b,w),  (unconstrained  entrepreneur).
(C3)
The assignment  of bequests  to the  appropriate  B-grid  points varies  according  to their occupational
choice.  For the workers  it is relatively  simple.  All  workers  with  given initial  wealth b will  bequest the
same  amount given in equation (C3)  above.  So we find  the B' E B' closest to that bequest B and  assign
the measure of all  workers  with initial wealth b to that particular  value.  More formally,
B'(b) = arg rm  iFnJIB - w(w - v + b)JI  (C4)
BEB'
and
g'(B'(b)) =  [1  - H(Ze(b, w))I g(b)  (C5)
where  g'(.)  denotes  the  bequest  (and  hence  next  period  wealth)  distribution.  We  can  then  proceed
analogously  for  all initial  wealth grid points b E  B.
The assignment  for entrepreneurs is more difficult because the bequest  also depends on the setup cost
x.  A  simple  straightforward  way would  be  to  discretize  x  and  then for  each  (x, b)  pair,  compute  the
corresponding  occupational  choice,  income and  bequest and  assign it to the closest B'-grid  point.  But
this  entails discretizing  z.  The  approach  we  take does away  with  discretizing  x.  The intuition  is to go
backwards.
Consider for example the  unconstrained entrepreneurs.  We know that for a given initial wealth b and
wage  w, all agents with setup cost x satisfying x E  [0, xu(b, w)]  will  fall into this category.  Their bequest
as shown by equation  (C3)  is linearly decreasing  in the setup cost x.  Therefore,  the bequest  by an agent
with  x =  xU(b,w)  will  be the smallest  among all  unconstrained  entrepreneurs.  Denote this bequest  by
B'. Similarly  we can define the  upper bound B'  as the bequest  of an unconstrained  entrepreneur  with
setup  cost z = 0.
Therefore, the bequests of all unconstrained entrepreneurs with initial wealth b satisfy B(b) E [BZ, Bu].
Now take  any point B'  in the support  of Btha  t  belongs  to this interval  [BL,  BH].  Then  all bequests
B e  [BL, B] will  be assigned to B'.  Naturally,
BL  =  -2  and  BH=B'+2 
2  ~~~~2
where 6  is the distance  between any  two consecutive  points  in the support  B'.  Using equation  (C3)  we
compute the setup  costs ZL  and iH  that yield,  respectively BL  and BH as optimal  bequests given initial
wealth b and wage w. We conclude then that all unconstrained entrepreneurs with setup costs x satisfying
z E  [XL,ZHI  will  bequest amounts B e [BL, B  I that wiU be assigned to B'.  The corresponding  density
is just H(ZH) - H(ZL)  multiplied by the density of the initial wealth b given by g(b).  We can proceed in
this fashion  for all grid points B'  E  [BL,  BH,I.
We treat the constrained entrepreneurs  similarly,  except  that in order to find the setup costs ZL  and
ZH one needs to solve a quadratic  equation  (rather than a simple linear  equation).
34Thus in the end, each agent with initial wealth b will have been assigned to a B'-value in next period
support B'.  Evidently the state (B', G', w') for next period  is enough to determine  next period's outcome,
without  further reference  to the details  of the contemporary  decision.
C.2  Computing the intermediated  economy
This section  describes the algorithm that computes  the equilibrium when capital  markets are introduced
in the economy.  We need to determine  the wage w  and interest  rate R simultaneously so that given the
two,  agents  make their occupational  choice  and the labor  and capital markets  clear.  The intermediated
and non-intermediated  sectors interact  here through  the cross-mobility  of workers.
The computational  program  runs two loops, the outer loop  determining  the wage w and  the inner
one  determining  the interest  rate R.  The algorithm  starts with  a guess  of the wage  w, and then the
algorithm  calls the  subroutine  that determines  the  interest rate  R.  That is, given  the wage  w, it finds
the capital market  interest  rate R in the intermediated  sector  that clears the capital  market.  Once the
interest rate R is determined,  the occupational choice in each sector is found.  We then check whether the
labor  market clears.  If not,  we update  the value of w  using the  bisection  method  described  above, but
here,  the interest  rate R is  determined at each update  of the wage w.  The labor market is in equilibrium
when equation  (19) in the main  text holds:
Ec(W, R) + ENc(w) + LC(w, R) + L dC(W) +Sc(w,  R) + SNc(w)  = 1  (C6)
We  can also rewrite  it as
Ec(w,  R) + LC(w,R)+SC(w,R) =f  and  ENC(w)+L  dC(W) +SNC(W)  =1-f,  (C7)
where f  is the relative  weight of the intermediated  (C) sector in the overall  economy.
The determination of end-of-period wealth  and hence bequests is easily done by tracking each sector
separately.
The  algorithm  determining  the interest  rate  R also  uses a bisection  method.  Similarly,  the  use  of
this method  is warranted  by the  fact that the capital  demand  of a particular firm in the intermediated
sector  ku (w, R) and the number of firms in that sector  as determined  by the critical value of setup costs
i(w, R) are both monotonically decreasing  in the interest rate  R, and thus a unique equilibrium  exists.
Net aggregate savings  follows equation  (17)  of the text and  is computed  as,
201  £(w,R)
D(w,R) = Zb,jc(b,) - ku(w,R)H(i(w,R),m) - xdH(x,m)  (C8)
i=1  ,
where  following  the  main  text notation,  9c( ) refers  to the  initial wealth  probability  function  in  the
intermediated  sector.
Intuitively,  if at a given  (w, R) pair D(w, R) is negative,  then the interest rate R is too low and needs
to be higher.  If on the contrary  D(w, R)  is positive,  then the guessed interest  rate  is too high and  so it
should be  lower,  except  if R  = 1.  In  fact,  when the interest  rate  R reaches the lower bound  one, both
the savings and the storage  technology  are equally  productive.  In other  words, there  is enough  capital
accumulation and net aggregate  savings D(w, R) can be strictly positive.
For a given  wage w,  the algorithm that determines the interest  rate R starts with RL  = 1 and some
arbitrary
4 8 upper bound RH.  It then computes  D(w, RL) with the interest  rate at the lower bound RL.
48Here we take the upper bound to be 10 from prior  experience
35This  is the obvious  initial  guess.  Then if D(w, RL)  > 0,  credit  market  clearing  is achieved.  If on the
contrary D(w, RL) < 0, there  is an excess  demand  of savings at the  prevailing interest  rate RL  and it
needs to be raised.  From here onwards,  following  closely the wage  algorithm,  it proceeds as follows:
1.  Update the interest rate to R' =  R,+RH  and compute D(w, R').
2
(a)  If D(w, R') <  0, update the lower  bound  RL = R' and repeat to Step  1.
(b)  If D(w, R')  > 0,  update the upper  bound RH = R'  and repeat  Step  1.
(c)  If D(w, R') = 0,  credit market  equilibrium is reached.
As before,  if no guess appears to ever clear  the market,  there is  a sequence  of shrinking  intervals with
the equilibrium interest rate trapped  in it, so if RH - RL < e, where again  e is a convergence  criterion,
then the program sets R = RL.
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Figure  2:  Occupational  Choice Map:  SES data  (left) and Townsend-Thai  data (right)
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Figure  8:  Welfare  Comparison in  1996:  Townsend-Thai  Data
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Figure  9:  Welfare Comparison in  1978:  SES Data
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Figure 11:  Foreign Capital  Inflows and Financial  Liberalization
Legend: - Fomgn Cap. Inflows  as a fraction of GDP,
- - Fraction  of population with access to intermediatton
Figure  12.  Access to Capital and Foreign  Cap.  Inflows:  SES (left)  and Townsend-Thai  (right)
Legend:  - (thick)  Thai Economy,  - Closed Economy,  - - Economy  with  capital flows  and linear
participation.
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